# **HUMAN AFFECTIONS IN PRE-MODERN THEOLOGY**

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The word "emotions," it has been noted, is not found in Scripture. Moreover, premodern or even early modern Christian theology knew nothing of emotions in the modern, scientific sense. Christian theology historically not only uses different terminology for human affectivity, but considers human affectivity in strikingly different ways.<sup>2</sup>

Throughout Christian history, different theologians and traditions have stressed either the intellect or the will. These two approaches have been called *intellectualism* and *voluntarism* respectively. Broadly, intellectualism (commonly understood as Aquinas's legacy) tends to emphasize the intellect; the will follows reason or the dictates of the understanding. Voluntarism accentuates the will and is commonly understood to be an Augustinian tradition. Intellectualism tends to emphasize contemplation of God as the ultimate good, while voluntarism emphasizes love for God. To be clear, neither intellectualism nor voluntarism addresses the importance of reason in life or the freedom of the will. Even allowing for such differences, intellectualists and voluntarists often share an understanding of what affections are, and how they are distinct from lower inclinations.<sup>3</sup>

In order to properly understand older ways of thinking about human affectivity, it is first important to clear away any assumption that earlier categories directly correlate to modern notions. At the most basic level, traditional Christian psychology understood affections as the inclinations and aversions of the soul. In general, Christian schemes of human affectivity held that the higher and lower parts of the soul experience distinguishable appetites. The appetite of higher soul corresponds to reason, understanding, and the will. The appetite of the lower soul analogously corresponds to the body and its senses. The present discussion will adopt the terms Aquinas occasionally gave these different movements, using *affections* to refer to the movements of the soul that answer to the rational appetite and *passions* to refer to those movements of the soul that answer to the sensitive appetites. Anot all theologians gave different names for the different movements; some authors considered all movements affections, and others considered them all passions. Nevertheless, Christian theologians for some seventeen hundred years consistently distinguished those inclinations and aversions of the soul that arose from sense pleasure and pain from those inclinations and aversions of the soul that arose from the good and evil of the "higher," rational faculties. Theologians and philosophers used these categories in their considerations of ethics, virtue, and the Christian operations of the soul such as love

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>This paper is an abridgement and slight development of the second chapter of my dissertation. See Ryan Martin, "'A Soul Enflamed with the High Exercises of Divine Love': Affections and Passions in the Theology of Jonathan Edwards," (PhD Diss., Central Baptist Theological Seminary, 2013), 35-110.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>These remarks follow the helpful summary of Richard A. Muller, *The Unaccommodated Calvin: Studies in the Foundation of a Theological Tradition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 162. Also see Norman Fiering, *Moral Philosophy*, 104-46. On this debate coming to a head in the controversies Jonathan Edwards's faced against Charles Chauncy, see George Marsden, *Jonathan Edwards*, 282-83.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>Why were such desires called *passions*? In one sense, a passion was an act of the soul that changed the body. Moreover, a passion was a desire of the sensitive or animal soul that acted upon the intellectual or rational soul, such that the rational soul suffered through this irrational desire. Finally, the animal soul itself was acted upon by sensory phenomena external to it, even though it was the disordered will that gave force to such unruly, vicious passions for sin. See Thomas Dixon, *From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 58-59.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Dixon, From Passions to Emotions, 26-61.

and faith. This basic outline is essential for understanding how the ideas of affections and passions in Christian antiquity differs from modern notions of emotions.<sup>6</sup>

The distinction between higher and lower appetites significantly influenced the thought of Christian theologians. Consider, for example, the universal agreement among Christian theologians that God, while impassible, is also a God who loves. Further, these doctors have always been suspicious of passions, but have simultaneously affirmed the necessity of love and joy. This is to say nothing of the deeper, careful conversations concerning the relations of such operations to virtue. On these points, the modern category of emotions will not do justice to the historical testimony. Something more is at work, and a fuller explanation is possible.

The testimony of Christian theologians concerning human affectivity bears strong marks of similarity on other key points. Nevertheless, theologians articulated the Bible's teaching in different ways. Differences over human affectivity abound, not only between different historical epochs of the church, but between different theologians within the same epoch.<sup>8</sup> As already noted, not every Christian thinker consistently distinguished affections and passions by name. Some stressed the distinction between the affections of a renewed and unrenewed will more than a distinction between movements of various appetites. Still, other key ideas were held in common. Many agreed that affections and passions are seated in the soul. Christian theologians commonly held that affections and passions are connected with the will and its operations. Finally, Christian ethics often touched directly on the object, nature, and subjects of affections and passions.

This paper will show how these themes were articulated among Christian theologians and other pre-modern thinkers. Particularly, the scope of this paper is the nature of affections and passions in pre-modern thought, as well as the consistent ways of distinguishing affective movements before a materialist or scientific framework became dominant.<sup>9</sup>

# **Augustine and Aquinas**

### Augustine

Augustine's writings are second only to those of Thomas Aquinas in their influence over Christian ideas of human affectivity. His thought is similar to that of other church fathers. Augustine most clearly articulated his understanding of affective psychology in *Confessions* and *The City of God.*<sup>10</sup>

Augustine said that humans have a material body and an immaterial soul, and that the soul has both lower and higher powers. The lower or earthly powers include sensation, imagination, or sense memory. The higher powers include *scientia* and *sapientia*. As the rational knowledge of earthly things,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>Simo Knuuttila explains the pattern this way: "While psychosomatic emotions were traditionally separated from the naturally elicited or supernaturally influenced acts of the intellectual soul, it was also recognized that there were structural similarities between all these phenomena and that emotional terms, such as love or fear, could be applied to all of them." *Emotions in Ancient and Medieval Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004), 257.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>The doctrine of divine impassibility does not rest solely on a distinction between appetites and their corresponding movements of the soul, but it is important part of the conversation. For more on divine impassibility among the church fathers, see Thomas G. Weinandy, *Does God Suffer?* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000), 83-107.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>Dixon, From Passions to Emotions, 26-29.

 $<sup>^9\</sup>mathrm{In}$  my dissertation, my interest was primarily Jonathan Edwards's "affective psychology," which included not only how he utilized these categories, but how his understanding of them related to traditional Christian thought. See "Affections and Passions."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>Augustine, Confessions, ed. W. H. D. Rouse, 2 vols., Loeb Classical Library 26-27 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977); idem, The City of God, trans. Marcus Dods (New York: The Modern Library, 1993); De civitate Dei (PL 41). On the life of Augustine, see Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo: A Bibliography, rev. ed. (London: Faber and Faber, 1967).

scientia makes right knowledge of the temporal world possible. Sapientia, on the other hand, is the highest power of the soul, and that for which the soul was created; sapientia contemplates divine or eternal truth. These two powers comprise the mens, or "inner man." Tragically fallen and disordered, the soul seeks happiness in sensual things. 12

The soul's various movements correspond to the different faculties. Proper affections of the soul take spiritual realities as their objects, such as fearing eternal damnation, sorrowing over sin, loving God, and desiring eschatological glory. People often still turn away from spiritual good. Through the lower appetites, passions powerfully draw people toward the sense world in rebellion against the rational soul.<sup>13</sup>

As Augustine saw it, passions and affections were fundamentally inclinations and aversions of the soul. Here Corrigan rightly observes that for Augustine "feeling was best understood in connection with volition."14 Augustine maintained but did not stress a distinction between affections, as movements of the rational soul and will, and passions, those inclinations and aversions related to sense experience.<sup>15</sup> Although Augustine believed the future human blessedness will include a state of simultaneous love and apatheia, he was more interested in stressing the sinfulness of affections (illustrated by the passion-driven demons) and the necessary role passions play in the present (Civ. .9.3). Nevertheless, Augustine did not condone a life given over to passion. The soul's higher faculties should regulate passions, which is only possible when people give their will to God. Augustine regarded the effects of passions on the body to be painful perturbations (Civ. 9.4).

Affections are good when the will is directed towards God, but the movements of the unbeliever's soul are evil, whether that passion is toward bodily pleasure or in sinful acts of the mind (Civ. 9.5). Augustine affirmed that passions are necessary for life, and, even in the future state of apatheia, love will remain. 16 All affections are connected with this life and its weakness, but in the age to come only love and joy will remain. Even so, fear and sorrow can be good affections in this life, provided they flow out of a love for God. Dixon helpfully observes that for modern readers Augustine appears inconsistent, sometimes dismissing "emotions" and at other times approving of them. He cautions,

But such a reading, employing the modern English-language category of the 'emotions', cannot capture Augustine's intent since he knew no such category (despite the use of the term in modern translations of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>Edmund Hill, "Forward to Books IX - XIV," in *The Trinity* (De Trinitate), vol. 5 of *The Works of Saint Augustine*, ed. John E. Rotelle (Hyde Park, N.Y.: New City Press, 1991), 258-65. Also see Dixon, From Passions to Emotions, 32.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>For example, see Trin. 11.2.6. Also see Robert J. O'Connell, St. Augustine's Early Theory of Man, A.D. 386-391 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), 217-8. Augustine said, "[The soul] finds delight in bodily shapes and movements, and because it has not got them with it inside, it wraps itself in their image which it has fixed in the memory. In this way it defiles itself foully with a fanciful sort of fornication by referring all its business to one or the other of the following ends: curiosity, searching for bodily and temporal experience through the senses; swollen conceit, affecting to be above other souls which are given over to their senses; or carnal pleasure, plunging itself in this muddy whirlpool" (Trin. 12.3.14).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup>See Dixon, From Passions to Emotions, 26-51. Augustine found from the senses a "confused multitudes of phantasies, which contradict one another." Therefore, the knowledge of the unchangeable was more sure than that which is changeable. "And now came I to have a sight of those invisible things of thee, which are understood by those things which are made" (Conf. 7.17).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup>"Introduction," in Oxford Handbook of Religion and Emotion (New York: Oxford, 2008), 4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup>See, for example, Conf. 1.18; 3.2; 4.6; 4.14; 4.15; 5.7; 9.8; 13.24, 34. Beat. 1.4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup>Agostino Trapé says that Augustine boiled down the passions to a shared ground in "love," allowing for three occasions of them: "absence of passion, ordered passion which is subject to reason, and disordered passion or concupiscence." "Saint Augustine," in The Golden Age of Latin Patristic Literature from the Council of Nicea to the Council of Chalcedon, vol. 4 of Patrology, ed. Angelo di Berardino, trans. Placid Solari (Westminster, Md.: Christian Classics, 1991), 414. The final of these three is evil. Trapé further posits from Augustine's Unfinished Work in Answer to Julian that the bishop "distinguished between passion and feeling." Compare C. Jul. op. imp. 4.29 and 4.69.

his work). We cannot expect to find in Augustine (or any other premodern author) any attitude towards the 'emotions'."  $^{17}$ 

Augustine distinguished affections and passions in several ways. <sup>18</sup> Sometimes the distinction is moral as Augustine divided vicious passions and virtuous affections. Other times, while employing the same word (*passions* or *affections*) the distinction was made with regard to the part of the soul moved, the difference consisting in the state of the will (*Civ.* 14.2, 4, 6). The movement of the higher soul toward God is good and honorable; sourced in divine love, all such movements are blessed. The movement of the lower soul toward temporal things is often evil and vicious; a distorted will is seen in confused and fleshly desires. The latter movements are perturbations lacking the serenity of affections. Spiritual persons tame their affections through grace, reorienting them toward God (*Civ.* 14.7). <sup>19</sup>

### Thomas Aquinas

Developing the thought of patristic thinkers such as Nemesius of Emesa and Augustine, Christian theologians of the Middle Ages perpetuated the distinction between movements of the soul's higher and lower faculties. Authors such as Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109) and Bernard of Clairvaux (1091-1153) continued to scrutinize the relationship of affections and passions both to the will and to virtue and vice.<sup>20</sup> While medieval Christian explanations of human affectivity were not uniform, certain themes remained constant.

Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), through writings including the monumental works *Summa Theologiae* and *Summa Contra Gentiles*, was especially influential over subsequent theology.<sup>21</sup> Aquinas is usually classified in the intellectualist tradition.

For Thomas, affections and passions were rooted in appetite rather than cognition (*ST* 1a 78, 1a 79.3 ad 3). He also distinguished the soul's higher movements from its lower and often baser (but

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup>"Revolting Passions," 300.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup>See especially the *City of God*, where Augustine says, "If these emotions and affections [*Hi motus*, *hi affectus*], arising as they do from the love of what is good and from a holy charity, are to be called vices, then let us allow these emotions which are truly vices to pass under the name of virtues. But since these affections [*affectiones*], when they are exercised in a becoming way, follow the guidance of right reason, who will dare to say that they are diseases or vicious passions [*vitiosas passiones*]? (Civ. 14.9). Elsewhere, Augustine was even more explicit as to the negative force of passions: "the Latin equivalent *passio* [to the Greek ἐν παθει ἐπιθυμιας], especially in the ecclesiastical use, is usually understood as a term of censure" (*Nupt.* 2.55). *The Anti-Pelagian Works of Saint Augustine, Bishop of Hippo*, trans. Peter Holmes (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1874).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>Other patristic theologians, such as Clement of Alexandria, Nemesius of Emesa, and Gregory of Nyssa, promoted teachings similar to those of Augustine. First, these movements are seated in the soul. Second, God (unlike humans) is not only impassible but also has an immutable will of love. Third, the passions of the soul are movements of the sense appetite toward the temporal world of sense and bodies. These passions are necessary for the present life, but are largely viewed from a disposition of suspicion and even scorn; in the life of the virtuous, passions will be strictly controlled by reason. Fourth, affections like love are entirely different from passions. The church fathers sometimes described such affections as lacking the disturbance of desire, but in full enjoyment of the possessed beloved object. See Clement of Alexandria, *The Stromata*, or *Miscellanies (ANF 2:299-568)*; *Cyril of Jerusalem and Nemesius of Emesa*, ed. William Telfer, LCC 4 (Philadelphia, Penn.: The Westminster Press, 1955); and Gregory of Nyssa, *On the Soul and the Resurrection*, trans. Catharine P. Roth, Popular Patristics Series 12 (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1993).

 $<sup>^{20}</sup>$ This is a severely limited list of examples. Many others could be studied at great profit. See Knuutila, *Emotions*, 177-255.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup>Thomas Gilby, introduction to *St. Thomas Aquinas: Philosophical Texts*, by Thomas Aquinas (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), xiii-xxii; Mark W. Elliott, "Thomas Aquinas," in *Shapers of Christian Orthodoxy*, ed. Bradley G. Green (Downers Grove, Ill.: IVP, 2010), 341-88; Gerald McDermott, *Great Theologians*, 63-78; Anton C. Pegis, introduction to *Introduction to Saint Thomas Aquinas*, by Thomas Aquinas (New York: The Modern Library, 1948), xi-xiii. Citations of the *Summa Theologiae* will begin with *ST* with following references: part, question, and article (for example, *ST* 1a 75.3). If referencing a reply to an objection, "ad" with the appropriate number will be supplied (for example, *ST* 1a 75.3 ad 3). Unless otherwise noted, the English edition cited is Thomas Aquinas, *The Treatise on Human Nature: Summa Theologiae 1a, 75–89*, ed. Robert Pasnau (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hacket, 2002).

necessary) counterparts (ST 1a 79.7, 79.8, 79.10; 81). He viewed human affectivity strictly as inclination and aversion (ST 1a 82.5 ad 1; 1a2ae 22.3 ad 1). The higher affection of love is praiseworthy, but the passions are to be moderated (ST 1a2ae 26.3, 28.5).

Aquinas further taught that while God had a will or intellectual appetite, he was not subject to a sensory appetite.<sup>22</sup> Love (a regard for good universally) exists in God, for love is the first principle of all movements of appetite (ST 1a 20.1). Acts of the sensory appetite, having with them bodily change, are passions, but the will's acts are not so designated. Love, joy, and delight may be called passions if they follow the sensory appetite or if they act upon the mover to move toward a more desirable state, but they are not passions if they are connected with the intellectual appetite.<sup>23</sup>

Dixon rightly observes that Augustine and Aquinas agreed on the distinction between the higher, rational soul and the lower, sensitive soul and on the conflict between the higher and lower movements of the soul.<sup>24</sup> Aquinas understood affections and passions to be movements of the soul and under the control of human beings— although not all people do control them. He maintained the distinction between the affections of the higher, rational soul and the passions of the lower, sensitive soul, (although they did not always apply the terms consistently). In fact, Aquinas described these distinctions with great specificity. He noted that passions have a corresponding material response in the body, but he seated passion itself in the sensitive soul. All Christian thinkers viewed the passions with suspicion, rebuking people who allowed themselves to be controlled by them and insisting passions be regulated by reason. At the same time, the authors emphasized love for God to the highest possible degree.

### **Reformation and Post-Reformation Thought**

Human affections were important in the thought of Reformation, Puritan, and early Enlightenment figures as well. Though they modified older views, key ideas from traditional Christian thought were perpetuated, including a distinction between the different appetites of the soul and the notion that human affectivity is defined by inclination and aversion. Although the Reformers and their followers did not stress a distinction between the quality of the movements of the higher and lower appetites, they did emphasize the heart as the seat of all affections. This emphasis continued through the Reformation up to the late Puritan period and into early Enlightenment moral philosophy.

### **Reformation Figures**

Philipp Melanchthon

The Loci Communes Theologici of Philipp Melanchthon (1497-1560), the first theological system of the Reformation, would influence the thought of John Calvin (1509-1564) on the affections. Appointed Wittenberg's first Greek professor at the age of 21, he was already maligning the Scholastics in favor of humanism. Only three years later he published his Loci, what he described as "a common outline of the

 $<sup>^{22}</sup>ST$  1a 19.1; 19.11. God has an appetite, not in the sense that anything actualizes a potency in God whereby he completes his being, but in a secondary sense, in that he delights in or is inclined toward what is already his. See Robert Miner, Thomas Aquinas on the Passions: A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 16. <sup>23</sup>See Diana Cates, *Aquinas on the Emotions: A Religious-Ethical Inquiry* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009), 194-201. Compare ST 1a2ae 26.3 ad 3. It is common to find translations of Aquinas's writings and Thomist

scholars both rendering passiones as "emotions." Robert Miner disapproves: "the practice of translating passiones by 'emotions,' rather than 'passions,' is misleading, since it necessarily obscures the question about the relation between passions and emotions" (Aquinas on Passions, 4).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup>From Passions to Emotions, 35.

topics that you can pursue in your study of Scripture."<sup>25</sup> Therein, the affections become a special point of emphasis, especially in Melanchthon's discussion of sin and the will. He lauds faith as an affection of the heart.

In his discussion of will Melanchthon sought simplicity and submission to Scripture. He thought that the Bible's teaching on the will had been distorted by attempts to placate human philosophy. Melanchthon believed that a cognitive and an appetitive faculty sufficiently explained the abilities of the human soul. Within the appetitive faculty the distance between will, affection, and appetite is in some ways slight: "[t]he faculty from which the affections [affectus] arise is that by which we either turn away from or pursue the things known, and this faculty is sometimes called 'will' (voluntas), sometimes 'affection,' and sometimes 'appetite.'" Though Melanchthon seemed to distinguish higher and lower appetites, his doctrine of the will emphasized the higher, because he believed that affections arose from it. The will or "heart" is the "fount" of affections, not only of the sensitive appetite, but also of spiritual movements like love, hate, and blasphemy.<sup>27</sup>

For Melanchthon, the will and affections are by nature wholly corrupt and confused. The heart represents the will and affections, and herein sin resides. Since the heart is depraved, the affections are outside a person's power. On this point he diverged from medieval theology: "the Schools are in error when they imagine that the will (*voluntas*) by its very nature opposes the affections, or that it is able to lay an affection aside whenever the intellect so advises or warns." Philipp regarded as self-contradictory the Scholastic doctrine that a person can will some act despite the opposition of affections. External acts without purity of heart are evil; vicious affections maligned humanity's best good works. Melanchthon stressed this conflict between internal inclinations and external acts. When the heart's affections oppose external acts, it is mere "simulation and deceit." The natural person, loving only what pleases self, is unable to love God. Depravity engulfs the whole person. Through an inordinate devotion to philosophy the Scholastics wrongly restricted the extent of sinful corruption to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup>Melanchthon, *Loci Communes Theologici*, in *Melanchthon and Bucer*, 70. Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent English citations of Melanchthon's *Loci* will come from Pauck's edition. The source for Latin citations will be Philipp Melanchthons, *Die Loci Communes*, ed. D. Th. Kolde (Erlangen: George Böhme, 1890). On Melanchthon and the *Loci*, see Wilhelm Pauck, "Editor's Introduction," in *Melanchthon and Bucer*, LCC 19 (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1969), 3-17.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup>Ibid., 23. Melanchthon explained, "I wanted to warn about this distinction which the Scholastics make lest they deceive anyone. They distinguish between the 'appetite of the intellect' and the 'sensitive appetite' (the appetite related to the senses), and they attribute depraved affections to the appetite of the senses, whereas they maintain that the appetite of the intellect is free of any defect (*vitium*)." Ibid., 48.

 $<sup>^{27}</sup>$ Ibid., 27, 47. See Michael B. Aune, "'A Heart Moved': Philip Melanchthon's Forgotten Truth About Worship," Lutheran Quarterly 12 (1998): 395-418.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup>Melanchthon, *Loci*, 27. Philipp's position on the whole depravity of humanity's "more excellent" *and* "lower" parts would come up in Martin Luther's *On the Bondage of the Will.* For example, Luther asks Erasmus, "For if what is most excellent in man is not ungodly and lost or damned, but only the flesh, or the lower and grosser desires, what sort of redeemer do you think we shall make Christ out to be? Are we to rate the price of his blood so low as to say that it has redeemed only what is lowest in man, and that what is most excellent in man can take care of itself and has no need of Christ?" *On the Bondage of the Will*, in *Luther and Erasmus: Free Will and Salvation*, LCC 17 (Philadelphia, Penn.: Westminster Press, 1969), 276. For an explicit reference to Melanchthon on this issue, see 271.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup>Ibid., 28. In his own words, Melanchthon said, "Thus, although we are by nature godless and downright despisers of God, . . . those fellows teach that the will (*voluntas*) can cause nature to love God."

<sup>30</sup>Ibid., 29-30.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup>Melanchthon described the human plight frankly: "you do not love God no matter how good he is, unless you think that he is useful for your plans and for yourself." Ibid., 41.

the sensory appetite.<sup>32</sup> Melanchthon understood the "natural man" to entirely depraved and under "natural affections and emotions [motibus obnoxius]."<sup>33</sup>

On the other hand, Melanchthon defined faith itself as an "affection of the heart." Here Melanchthon specifically responded to Scholasticism's reduction of faith to mere assent. Using the example of King Saul in the Old Testament, Melanchthon observed that, despite Saul's knowledge of the judgment and mercy of God, the king did not have "faith," or seek after God. Saul's *heart* did not correspond to the *opinion*. Melanchthon compared this to his readers' own "uncleanness of heart," demonstrated in their devotion to worldly "desires." True faith in Christ stills the heart and moves the believer to thankfulness and good works. The love of God required in the First Commandment pertains to the affections and can only be produced by the Spirit. Elsewhere he wrote, "Faith therefore is an affection, which certainly clings to the promises and threatenings of God."

# John Calvin

On many points, John Calvin's understanding of human affections resonates with that of Melanchthon. Calvin himself was an ardent man who believed that affection for God was a crucial part of genuine *pietas*.<sup>39</sup> While employing the medieval Christian understanding of affections and passions as a basic framework for his own understanding of human affectivity, Calvin was not content to leave the framework untouched, but offered an Augustinian critique of some aspects of the medieval Scholastic model.

In the first book of his *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, Calvin acknowledged theories about the faculties of the soul that were espoused by "philosophers," but he saw little in the theories that would promote godliness.<sup>40</sup> He distinguished three appetitive faculties: the will, the irascible appetite, and concupiscence.<sup>41</sup> Nevertheless, Calvin believed that it was best to conceive of two simple, fundamental faculties of the soul: the understanding and the will. The will follows the judgment of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup>Ibid., 46. Melanchthon also stressed the lack of freedom in both appetites. Ibid., 48.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup>Ibid., 131. Melanchthon added, "By 'flesh' are meant the natural human feelings, not only being hungry and thirsty, but loving wealth and glory and other things of this kind." Note the depravity of both appetites—hunger and thirst refer to sense appetite, while greed and pride refer to the higher appetite.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup>Ibid., 90.

 $<sup>^{35\</sup>text{``}}$  Are you not worried," Melanchthon asked, "about your livelihood, reputation, life, children, and wife because you trust God too little, because you do not weigh the abundance of divine mercy?" Ibid.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup>Ibid., 92.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup>Ibid., 54. "[L]ove for God is the fruit of faith." Ibid., 147.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup>Melanchthon, *De Arte Concionandi Formulae ut Breves, Ita Doctae & Piae* (Basil, 1540), 57. "Fides igitur est affectus, qui certo affentit promissionibus Dei, & comminationibus." Author's translation.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup>On Calvin, see Theodore Beza, *The Life of John Calvin*, trans. Henry Beveridge (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1909); John T. McNeill, *The History and Character of Calvinism* (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), 93-234; and William J. Bouwsma, *John Calvin: A Sixteenth Century Portrait* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 9-31. On Calvin and *pietas*, see Elsie Anne McKee, introduction to John Calvin, *Writings on Pastoral Piety*, Classics of Western Spirituality (Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press, 2001), 2-5, and Joel R. Beeke, *Puritan Reformed Spirituality: A Practical Theological Study from our Reformed and Puritan Heritage* (Darlington, England: Evangelical Press, 2006), 1-33. On Calvin and emotions, see McNeill, *Calvinism*, 116.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> The soul is "an incorporeal substance." *Institutes* 1.15.2; 1.15.6. All English citations of the *Institutes* are from John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles (Philadelphia, Penn.: Westminster Press, 1960). Latin citations of the *Institutes* are from Ioannis Calvini, *Institutio Christianae Religionis*, ed. August Tholuck (Berlin: Gustav Eichler, 1834).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup>Institutes 1.15.6. Pace Kyle Fedler, who says that "Calvin rejects the notion that emotions are located in and derived from an independent faculty, like the 'oretic' [sic] faculty posited by Aquinas." "Calvin's Burning Heart: Calvin and the Stoics on the Emotions" JSCE 22 (2002): 137. Calvin also distinguished other powers of the soul: information obtained by the five senses pools into the common sense, which is then distinguished by fancy. Reason "embraces universal judgment," and the understanding studiously contemplates what reason produces.

understanding, which includes sense.  $^{42}$  As a result of his study of Scripture, Calvin argued that the mind and heart correspond to the understanding and will.  $^{43}$ 

Calvin assumed the basic Scholastic framework for understanding the soul, yet he explicitly rejected some views of the medieval Christian "philosophers," especially with respect to their moral philosophy. For example, Calvin argued that the difference between virtue and vice does not lie in following reason instead of the senses. Christian philosophers had forced a reconciliation between Christian dogma and philosophy and had thereby overlooked human depravity. <sup>44</sup> Calvin objected to the idea that reason alone can guide toward the virtuous life through free will. <sup>45</sup> For Calvin, without grace the will and senses are inclined toward evil. An unregenerate will is corrupt and unable to choose the good.

Calvin believed that pious affections are necessary for true saving faith, a doctrine that later Reformed teachers would also emphasize. By nature people are tainted by corrupt thoughts and affections. Without heart affections, humans cannot even begin to approach God, for faith itself "is more of the heart than the brain, and more of the disposition [affectus] than of the understanding." Christian affections do not bypass the understanding; they are not animal passions. Such affections flow from the heart; they are "neither lifeless nor bestial," but the result of the Spirit's grace in the heart and understanding. The Holy Spirit is the source of the Christian's affections. Therefore, doctrines should be held, not only by the understanding and memory, but in "the whole soul," including the heart's affections. Without such pious affections, God cannot even be worshiped aright. Christians should also lay aside affections for earthly things. Since the saving saving and the saving saving and saving affections for earthly things.

Although he did not emphasize it, Calvin accepted the distinction between higher and lower movements of the soul.<sup>53</sup> For example, he regarded it a sin to yield to "unbridled appetites" and passions.<sup>54</sup> He was also concerned with disordered affections and, when describing such movements,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup>Ibid., 1.15.7. I agree with Muller that Calvin was a voluntarist, but with statements like that in *Institutes* 1.15.7, Calvin sounds inconsistent. Muller, *Unaccommodated Calvin*, 164-67; 170-73.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup>Calvin explains, "Scripture is accustomed to divide the soul of man, as to its faculties, into two parts, the mind and the heart. The mind means the understanding, while the heart denotes all the dispositions or wills." *The Epistles of Paul the Apostle to the Galatians, Ephesians, Philippians and Colossians*, trans. T. H. L. Parker, Calvin's Commentaries 11 (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans, 1965), 290. Also see Muller, *Unaccommodated Calvin*, 167-70.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup>Institutes, 1.15.8. Calvin explained the view of the "philosophers": "They hold that the appetite, if it undertakes to obey the reason and does not permit itself to be subjected to the senses, is borne along to the pursuit of virtues, holds the right way, and is molded into the will." Ibid., 2.2.2. Compare ibid., 2.1.9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup>Ibid., 2.2.2-4; 2.2.12.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup>Ibid., 3.3.19.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup>Ibid., 3.2.8. Also see ibid., 3.3.16 and Calvin's remarks on repentance in ibid., 3.3.6. See Muller, *Unaccommodated Calvin*, 161-64. Calvin said, "It follows that faith can in no wise be separated from a devout [affection] [Consequitur, fidem a pio affectu nllo modo esse distrahendam]." Calvin was careful to emphasize that the assent of faith "rests upon such pious [affection]." *Institutes*, 3.2.8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup>John Calvin, Foreword to the Psalter, trans. Charles Garside, in Writings on Pastoral Piety, 92.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup>Calvin, *Institutes*, 3.3.8. Also see ibid., 3.6.4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup>Ibid., 3.7.4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup>Calvin said, "[T]he beginning of right living is spiritual, where the inner [affection] of the mind is unfeignedly dedicated to God for the cultivation of holiness and righteousness [*ubi interior animi affectus sine fictione ad sanctitatem et iustitiam colendam Deo addicitur*]." Ibid., 3.7.5.

 $<sup>^{52}</sup>$ lbid., 3.6.3. For Calvin, the sum of the Christian life is self-denial, which includes a subjection of the affections to God. Ibid., 3.7.8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup>Calvin most often used the word *affections* to refer to the soul's appetitive movements. Sometimes he used the word *passions*, but as a synonym for *affections*. Ibid., 2.2.23. Also see Calvin's commentary on John 11:33. Ioannis Calvini, *In Evangelium Ioannis*, vol. 3 of *Novum Testamentum Commentarii*, ed. August Tholuck (Berlin: Gustav Eichler, 1833), 220-21.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup>John Calvin, Commentaries on the First Twenty Chapters of the Book of the Prophet Ezekiel, trans., Thomas Myers (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Book House, 1979), 115 (Commentary on Ezek 16:17). Calvin said in 2 Pet 2:10 that the phrase to "walk after the flesh . . . means to be given up to the flesh just as brute beasts do not behave rationally or responsibly but are

occasionally used the words libido or cupiditates.<sup>55</sup> Virtue is not a matter of following the soul's higher movements, for the whole soul is deprayed and needs grace. The ungodly who control their passions externally are simply "the more strongly . . . inflamed" within. <sup>56</sup> By nature all human faculties are depraved, including the affections and desires.<sup>57</sup> Although Calvin rarely distinguished the terms affections and passions, he did make a conceptual distinction between the soul's movements.<sup>58</sup>

Scholastic theology framed the discussion of human affections for both Melanchthon and Calvin. The Reformers saw affections to be inclinations or aversions, and they recognized the affections to be closely connected with the will. They strongly opposed the idea that only the passions were depraved. Depravity affected the whole person, both the higher and lower appetites. Total depravity in turn supported their theology of the will and its freedom. Both, however, viewed affection for God as a necessary part of saving faith.<sup>59</sup> For them, the most important affections—affections for God—came only through a gracious work of the Spirit. Both taught that improper affections to the world of sense and pleasure were to be curbed and avoided. Therefore, although the emphasis on higher and lower faculties is not found in either Melanchthon or Calvin, medieval Scholastic thought on human affectivity informed both their teaching on the wholly depraved person as well as their understanding of faith as including a Spirit-wrought love and desire for God.

#### The Post-Reformation Tradition

A general consensus existed concerning the passions and affections from the patristic period to the middle of the sixteenth century. Although important differences existed between the individual theologians, they understood affections and passions to be seated in the soul, defined them as inclination and aversion, and often distinguished between the movements of the body and of the soul.

The Puritan and Reformed Scholastic tradition perpetuated the outlines of traditional Christian understandings of human affectivity. All the authors examined to this point taught to some extent the

guided entirely by their fleshly desires." John Calvin, The Epistle of Paul The Apostle to the Hebrews and The First and Second Epistles of St Peter, trans. William B. Johnston, Calvin's Commentaries 12 (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans, 1963), 351 (Comm. on 2 Pet 2:10).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup>Calvin, Institutes, 2.2.13; 2.5.14; 2.7.10; 3.10.3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup>Ibid., 2.7.10. Calvin observed that in Jude 19, "The soul is here set against the Spirit, that is , the renewal effected by grace; hence, the senses in their depraved condition, such as in men not yet born again. In our degenerate nature, which we derive from Adam, there is only the base and earthly material, no part of us aspiring to God, until we are renewed by His Spirit." John Calvin, A Harmony of the Gospels: Matthew, Mark and Luke Volume III and the Epistles of James and Jude, trans. A. W. Morrison (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans, 1972), 333-34 (Comm. on Jude 19).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup>Calvin, *Institutes*, 3.3.12.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>58</sup>Calvin maintained both divine impassibility and God's capacity for love and hatred. Ibid., 1.15.5; 2.16.1-4. God's affections, like his will and counsel, do not change. Ibid., 1.17.13. The incarnate Christ experienced affections like other people because affections are not sinful per se. Human passions are sinful when immoderate and misdirected. Calvin said, "I say that there is excess because none rejoices or grieves only sufficiently or as God permits, and many even shake off the bridle altogether. The vanity of our mind makes us sorrow or grieve over trifles, or for no reason at all, because we are too much devoted to this world. Nothing like this was to be found in Christ. No passion of His ever went beyond its proper bounds. He had none that was not right and founded on reason and sound judgment." Comm. on John 11:33. Calvin, The Gospel according to St John 11-21 and The First Epistle of John, trans. T. H. L. Parker (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1959), 12. See Fedler, "Calvin's Burning Heart," 151-52 and Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), 218-27. Calvin also held that Jesus assumed the weakness of passions, but those movements were strictly moderate, proper, and sinless. Institutes, 2.16.12. Only with shared passions can Christ have a shared human nature. God created Adam and Eve with affections, but their affections in innocence always submitted to reason. So Christ's affections were "without ἀταξία." Comm. on John 11:33. Calvin explains, "If you compare his passions with ours, they are as different as pure, clear water flowing in a gentle course from muddy and thick foam." Fedler explains ἀταξία to mean "disorderly, undisciplined, irregular, or inordinate." "Calvin's Burning Heart," 153.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup>The legacy of this emphasis will be seen in the Puritan authors surveyed below.

importance of love for God. The Puritan tradition combined the Augustinian emphasis on love, the distinction between affections and passions, and, of even greater significance, the Reformed insistence on a graciously changed heart and will. These ideas were gathered into something like an obsession with affections. In some respects the result sounds like Aristotelian Augustinianism.

Despite larger intellectual trends developed by the likes of René Descartes (1596-1650), the Cambridge Platonists, and other early Enlightenment figures, the Reformed tradition perpetuated the idea of affections as inclinations of the soul distinct from lower movements and maintained the centrality of affections in Christian life.<sup>60</sup>

William Ames (1576-1633)

The Marrow of Theology by William Ames (1576-1633) influenced many generations of New England Puritan pastors. 61 In Marrow, Ames said that faith produces the "primary and intimate affection toward God" in saints capable of establishing a relationship between them and God. 62 Ames suggested five properties of this faith:

1) a knowledge of what God testifies to; 2) a pious affection toward God which gives his testimony greatest force with us; 3) an assent given to the truth testified to, because of this affection toward God who is the witness of it; 4) a resting upon God for the receiving of what is given; and 5) the choosing or apprehension of what is made available to us in the testimony.<sup>63</sup>

Ames said the affections of faith are seated in the will.<sup>64</sup> Likewise, the love that flows from faith is itself an affection whereby believers submit to God. 65 Ames insisted, "We can in no way love God with too much intensity." This "inward affection" is necessary for worship. 66 Ames regarded singing as a way whereby the "pious affections" of saints are stirred up. Christian ministers also have the responsibility to evoke "godly affections."67

<sup>60</sup>Brumm Ursula, "Passions and depressions in early American puritans," in La passion dans le monde anglo-américain aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles (Paris: Universite de Bourdeaux, 1978), 85-96. Compare Miller, The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century. Although Miller saw the distinction between the rational and sensitive soul, he wrongly read both passions and affections as movements of the sensitive soul. For more on the broader intellectual developments in these areas during this time of early Enlightenment, see Dixon, From Passions to Emotions, 76-77, 83-85; Anthony Levi, French Moralists: The Theory of the Passions 1585 to 1649 (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), 268-69; René Descartes, The Passions of the Soul, trans. Stephen Voss (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett, 1989); Blaise Pascal, Pensées, trans. A. J. Krailsheimer (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1966): Discourse on the Passion of Love, in Blaise Pascal: Thoughts and Minor Works, Harvard Classics 48, trans., O. W. Wright (New York: P. F. Collier and Son, 1938); See OCP, s.v. "Cambridge Platonists"; Norman Fiering, Jonathan Edwards's Moral Thought, 124-25, 124-25n43; Francis Hutcheson, An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, 3d ed. (Glasgow: Robert & Andrew Foulis, 1769); Fiering, Moral Philosophy, 198-206; Martin, "Affections and Passions," 83-92.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>61</sup>On Ames, see John D. Eusden, introduction to William Ames, *The Marrow of Theology* (1968; repr., Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Books, 1997), 3-11, and Beeke and Pederson, Meet the Puritans, 33-51. The Latin title for Marrow is Medulla theologiae. On Edwards and Ames, see "Misc. 961," in WJE 20:242n7; WJE 2:174-75n3; 2:362n9; 2:374n4; and Smith, "Editor's Introduction," in WJE 2:67-68 and 26:429. Edwards used Ames's description of divinity as "the doctrine of living to God." Sermons and Discourses, 1739-1742, vol. 22 of The Works of Jonathan Edwards, Harry S. Stout and Nathan O. Hatch with Kyle P. Farley, eds. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2003), 86. See Ames, Marrow, 77.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>62</sup>Ames, Marrow of Theology, 176. Also see ibid., 241.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid., 241. Compare ibid., 258 and William Ames, The Substance of Christian Religion: or, A plain and easie Draught of the Christian Catechisme (London: T. Mabb for T. Davies, 1659), 50-51.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>64</sup>Ibid., 87, 241. Also see ibid., 239 and Fiering, Moral Philosophy, 123. Ames argued that the affections attributed to God in Scripture either represent God's will or figuratively apply to God.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>66</sup>Ibid., 238. Also see ibid., 239 and 301. Ames calls zeal the "intensity of pure affection." Ibid., 223. See Ames,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>67</sup>Ibid., 263, 193. Compare ibid., 195.

Ames not only connected affections with the will, but he also distinguished the will and the sensory appetite. Original sin corrupts the whole person, including the affections.<sup>68</sup> Sinful affections are inordinate. 69 The lost, when condemned to eternal death, continue to sin against God with their affections. 70 Ames saw unbelievers as plagued with concupiscence, passions, and inordinate desires, though even saints struggle with such sins.<sup>71</sup> Ministers should not stir up such "carnal affections" with their preaching.<sup>72</sup> Ames distinguished the appetites, both of which are deprayed in the wicked.

For in all men there appears a manifest perversion of our wills, and inward appetite; as much as spiritual and truly good things are of no good relish to all animall and naturall men: but the contrary evils, which of their own nature have no good rellish, seem to them most sweet: Now as the perversion of the sensitive appetite doth denote bodily sicknesse, so the perversion of the inmost & most spiritual appetite, doth point forth unto us sickness that is inward and in the spirit. The same also may be observed of the perversion of the judgement and understanding, from whence come so many and shamefull errours, whereby good is esteemed evill, and evill good.<sup>73</sup>

Ames affirmed the traditional distinction between appetites, but equally upheld the Reformation doctrine that the whole person is deprayed. Ames, as a voluntarist, followed Augustine in stressing the role of the heart in salvation, but maintained Scholastic psychological model in differentiating the soul's movements.74

John Owen (1616-1683)

John Owen (1616-1683) also taught that affections were a necessary part of true religion.<sup>75</sup> Owen's thought in many ways anticipates that of Edwards. Owen presented the will and affections as intricately linked faculties. <sup>76</sup> For Owen, the Spirit worked in the regenerate so that affections are no longer drawn to sin but to God.<sup>77</sup> Seated in the heart or rational soul, affections in believers are the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>68</sup>Ibid., 171, 225, 120. Compare ibid., 313. Also see Ames, Substance, 204.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>69</sup>Marrow, 313, 320.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>70</sup>Ibid., 126.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>71</sup>Ibid., 319, 329. Also see 171.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>72</sup>Ibid., 194.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>73</sup>Ames, Substance, 22. Ames continued, "It is manifest that there is in all men a certain rebellion of the inferiour and animall faculties and appetites against the superiour and most spiritual faculties of the soul; which shews the sickness of the upper part, as not having strength enough to govern the lower; and again, a disorder and confusion of the inferiour faculties, whereby they will not be subject to their Superiour." Pace Walton, Jonathan Edwards, 79.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>74</sup>Fiering explains, "Ames's analysis, we may remark, is an especially clear instance of both the Scholastic and the Augustinian theory of the will combining to break through the Thomist Scholastic structure, a process that was going on generally in the seventeenth century." Moral Philosophy, 122-3. On the inconsistencies and conflicts arising from Ames's voluntarism, see Fiering, 122-27.

<sup>75</sup>See Peter Toon, God's Statesman: The Life and Work of John Owen: Pastor, Educator, Theologian (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1971), and Carl R. Trueman, John Owen: Reformed Catholic, Renaissance Man, Great Theologians Series (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2007). Kelly M. Kapic discusses Owen and affections in Communion with God: The Divine and the Human in the Theology of John Owen (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Academic, 2007), 53-56. He also notes the influence of Aristotle's faculty psychology on Owen. Ibid., 65-66. On Owen and Edwards, see Walton, Jonathan Edwards, 104-16.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>76</sup>The Nature, Power, Deceit, and Prevalency of the Remainders of Indwelling Sin in Believers, in Works 6:282. On the connection of will and affections see, for example, ibid., 6:268, 270, 275, 281, 282, 285. At other times Owen clearly distinguished the will and affections. For example, Owen called the will a rational appetite, but departed from a Thomist notion of rational appetite, understanding "rational appetite" to refer to the different influences on the will. So "rational" means the will is "guided by the mind," whereas "appetite" means the will is "excited by the affections." Ibid., 6:254. Also see ibid., 6:195.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>77</sup>Communion with God, in The Works of John Owen, ed. William H. Goold (Philadelphia: Leighton Publications, 1857), 2:228. Elsewhere Owen called this work a "habit of grace," which is "a new, gracious spiritual life, or principle, created, and bestowed on the soul, whereby it is changed in all its faculties and affections, fitted and enabled to go forth in the way of obedience unto every divine object that is proposed unto it, according to the mind of God." Ibid., 2:200. See also ibid., 2:240. Also see The Grace and Duty of Being Spiritually Minded, in Works, 7:270-71.

result of the Father's own initial love for them. 78 Christ is "a fit object" for the saint's "choicest affections."<sup>79</sup> As Christ's bride, the believing soul has "conjugal affections" with her Savior. <sup>80</sup> Believers reciprocate back to Christ the love their Savior has shown them.<sup>81</sup> Owen described love for Christ as "a πάθος, or earnest affection."82 Believers should keep their conjugal affections for Christ "chaste and loyal."83 These affections are the result of the Spirit's grace of regeneration, which "fills up the affections with spiritual things, fills the soul with spiritual love, joy, and delight, and exerciseth all other affections about their proper objects."84 Owen understood regeneration to be a physical change in the "whole rational soul" or heart, which includes not only a spiritual change in the mind and will, but also sanctifying the previously depraved affections. 85 More than merely changing depraved affections, in regeneration the Spirit implants "a prevailing love" in the soul. This is "circumcision of heart," which Owen emphasizes is the "depravation", not only of the "sensitive part of the soul," but the "affections" as well. Thereby the Spirit crucifies the "enmity, carnal prejudices, and depraved inclinations," and gives the saint "holy spiritual love, joy, fear, and delight." This work does not alter "the being of our affections," but sanctifies and unites them "unto their proper object in a due manner."86

Owen also warned against evil and distorted desires, often designating them "passions." Because, as 1 Thes 5:23 teaches, sanctification reaches even the body, individuals may not excuse their sins and passions to "their constitutions and inclinations." For Owen, the Spirit's gracious work operated through the souls of believers to "cure morally sinful distempers, as of passion, elation of mind, and intemperances"— states brought about by bodily constitutions,89 Although the Holy Spirit does not alter the nature of passions in the regenerate, the grace and holiness of the Spirit does "morally" influence them "so that the constitution itself shall be no more such a *fomes* and incentive unto disorderly passions as it hath been."90 Owen variously described the affections of unbelievers as corrupt, disordered, rebellious, and drawn to idols. 91 The affections that answer to the sensitive appetite are evil when they control individuals. Those who are enslaved to such "brutish, sensual affections" are "like

 $<sup>^{78}</sup>$ Πνευματολογια, or a Discourse Concerning the Holy Spirit, in Works, 3:326, 329; Owen, Communion, in Works, 2:28, 34. <sup>79</sup>Ibid., 2:53. On the believer's affections for the excellency of Christ, see ibid., 2:139.

<sup>80</sup>Ibid., 2:54-78.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid., 2:117-18. Compare Owen, Spiritual Mindedness, in Works, 7:475.

<sup>82</sup> Communion, in Works, 2:126.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid., 2:147. Owen said, "[Christ] is married unto us, and we unto him; which spiritual relation is attended with suitable conjugal affections." Owen argued that the reference to "belly" in Song 5:14 speaks of "bowels" or affections. Ibid., 2:77. See the full discussion of the believer's chastity for Christ, ibid., 2:146-52. Compare Πνευματολογια, in Works 3:187.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>84</sup>Πνευματολογια, in Works, 2:240. Ordinate affections accompany not only regeneration itself, but the preparatory work of the Holy Spirit to regeneration. This preparatory work is moral, and not "physical." See ibid., 2:301-07. The actual or "whole" work of regeneration by the Holy Spirit, however, "is a real physical work, whereby he infuseth a gracious principle of spiritual life into all that are effectually converted and really regenerated, and without which there is no deliverance from the state of sin and death which we have described." Ibid., 2:307.

<sup>85</sup>Ibid., 3:326, 315, 329-30. A "physical" is a supernatural change of physis or nature, as opposed to a moral change produced by mere intellectual persuasion.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid., 3:335.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>87</sup>See, for example, Communion with God, in Works, 2:112; Spiritual Mindedness, in Works, 7:358, 418-19, 468, 470, and especially 494-95; Πνευματολογια, in Works, 3:217, 360, 422, 554-55, 558, 587, 632, 642, 643, 647. Owen observed, "Vanity, instability, folly, sensual, irrational appetites, inordinate desires, self-quieting and torturing passions, act continually in our depraved natures." Ibid., 3:642.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>88</sup>Πνευματολογια, in Works, 3:422.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>89</sup>Ibid. In Spiritual Mindedness, Owen carefully warned that "the wandering and roving of the outward senses" oppose spiritual affections. Spiritual Mindedness, in Works, 7:487; see ibid., 7:485-86.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>90</sup>Πνευματολογια, in Works, 3:422.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>91</sup>Πνευματολογια, in Works 3:17, 33, 142, 224, 276, 558.

beasts," debasing themselves and their "more noble faculties." Passions are not intrinsically evil, for Adam was originally created with right affections, and the human nature of Christ in part was characterized by an "unspeakable zeal for, and ardency of affection unto, the glory of God."93 Because of deprayity, however, the human will and affections are weakened, impotent, stubborn and obstinate.94 All people are naturally disposed to certain passions, and, though not sinful in itself, this disposition "dwells at the next door unto [sin], and as it is excited by the moral pravity of our natures, a continual occasion of it."95 Moreover, like Calvin and Melanchthon, Owen objected to any notion that the "natural man" in Scripture refers merely to those ruled by corrupt affections. The sensual appetite has its depraved lusts, but so does the mind. 96 Natural affections never receive spiritual things and directly oppose them.<sup>97</sup> The will and affections only pursue evil because they are enslaved to the directives of the deceived and depraved mind.98

Similar emphases arise in Owen's The Grace and Duty of Being Spiritually Minded, in which he suggested three aspects of having a mind of the Spirit: (1) "[t]he actual exercise of the mind, in its thoughts, meditations, and desires, about things of spiritual beauty"; (2) "[t]he inclination, disposition, and frame of the mind, in all its affections, whereby it cleaves unto spiritual things"; and (3) "[a] complacency of mind, from that gust, relish, and sayour, which it finds in spiritual things, from their suitableness unto its constitution, inclinations, and desires." Only the regenerate have spiritual minds in this sense. The basis of spiritual mindedness is in a person's affections, which Owen called "the spring" of one's "thoughts." 100 To be earthly minded, on the other hand, is either to love earthly things in a predominant way or to have "inordinate affection" for worldly things. 101 Natural affections for God may arise in a mind not truly spiritual, as they do in hypocrites. Affections, therefore, can be either spiritual or earthly. When Owen stressed the spirituality of the affections, he included three necessary qualities of spiritual affections: (1) a spiritual principle renewing them, (2) a spiritual object, and (3) a spiritual manner of fastening to their object. 102 In sum, God demands more than the moderation of human affections for worldly objects—he also demands to be the object of affections. 103 Even so, Owen

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>92</sup>Spiritual Mindedness, in Works, 7:480. Owen added, "Look, how much vile affections, fixed on and furiously pursuing things carnal and sensual, do debase our nature beneath its rational constitution, and make it degenerate into bestiality; so much spiritual affections, fixed on and cleaving unto things spiritual and heavenly, do exalt our nature above its mere natural capacity, making and approach unto the state of angels and of just men made perfect." Ibid., 7:480. For "brutish" affections as sensuality, compare Πνευματολογια, in Works 3:268, 296.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>93</sup>Πνευματολογια, in Works, 3:101-102, quoting 3:178.

<sup>94</sup>Ibid., 3:244.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>95</sup>Ibid., 3:167. The incarnate Christ himself took on these passions as part of his human nature, but was free from "the bodily diseases and distempers" that characterize the rest of humanity.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>96</sup>Indwelling Sin, in Works 6:190.

<sup>97</sup>Ibid., 6:270.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>98</sup>Ibid., 6:281. This passage sounds like the statement of an intellectualist, but Owen is usually considered a voluntarist. See Fiering, Moral Philosophy, 140 and Kapic, Communion with God, 50-53.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>99</sup>Spiritual Mindedness, in Works, 7:270. The way that Owen described this complacency especially resonates with the later thought of Edwards: "There is a salt in spiritual things, whereby they are condited and made sayoury unto a renewed mind.... In this gust and relish lies the sweetness and satisfaction of spiritual life. Speculative notions about spiritual things, when they are alone, are dry, sapless, and barren. In this gust we taste by experience that God is gracious, and that the love of Christ is better than wine, or whatever else hath the most grateful relish unto sensual appetite. This is the proper foundation of that 'joy which is unspeakable and full of glory.'" Ibid., 7:270-71. Note especially Owen's citation of 1 Pet 1:8, the text behind Edwards's Religious Affections. Also see ibid., 7:471-73, 483.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>100</sup>Ibid., 7:361, 270-71. Also see ibid., 7:395.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>101</sup>Ibid., 7:272-73. Also see ibid., 7:356-57, 361-62, 411-15.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>102</sup>Ibid., 7:411. Also see ibid., 7:290-91 and 7:397. Compare ibid., 7:296, 482-83.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>103</sup>Ibid., 7:419-23.

seated affections in the higher faculties. 104 Affections are vital for religion, and nothing good is done for God or others without proper affections behind those actions. Affections are to the soul what the "helm" is to a "ship." 105 Therefore, "[t]he chief work of a Christian is to make all his affections, in all their operations, subservient unto the life of God."106 In addition, Owen observed, "[a]ffections so disposed constantly find a gust, a pleasant taste, a relish, in spiritual things"; such affections answer to "a spiritual appetite unto heavenly things." <sup>107</sup>

# Others Examples from the Puritan Tradition

These themes reverberate through Puritan theology. First, many uphold the distinction between appetites and the soul's movements. Richard Sibbes (1577-1635) said Christ graciously helps saints "subdue in some measure" their "base affections." 108 Although Sibbes exalted the role of affections in religion (see below), he defined passions as movements of the "baser part of the soul." 109 Sibbes understood that passions are natural, but the heart dedicated to God must govern them through iudgment. 110 John Preston (1587-1628) said the disposition of an affection differs from the momentary outbursts of passions. Therefore hatred is an affection, not a passion, because "it is a bent, a disposition and frame of the will," whereas anger, on the other hand, is a passion, as it "dies and flittes away after a time."111 Similarly, in his influential A Treatise of the Passions and Faculties of the Soul of Man, Edwards

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>104</sup>For example, Owen taught that spiritually minded individuals have better proof of their gracious state by their "holy complacency" than "sensible evidence." Ibid., 7:295. Compare ibid., 7:468.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>105</sup>Ibid., 7:396-97. Owen wrote, "The great contest of heaven and earth is about the affections of the poor worm which we call men." Ibid., 7:395. Affections are "the seat of all sincerity." Ibid., 7:396.

<sup>107</sup>Ibid., 7:471. Owen said that renewed affections beholding God in Christ, "have an infinite beauty, goodness, and amiableness in them, which are powerfully attractive of spiritual affections, and which alone are able to fill them, to satisfy them, to give them rest." Ibid., 7:475. Also see ibid., 7:484.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>108</sup>The Bruised Reed and Smoking Flax, in The Works of Richard Sibbes, ed. Alexander Balloch Grosart (Edinburgh: James Nichol, 1862), 1:79.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>109</sup>The Bruised Reed, in Works 1:83. Compare The Soul's Conflict with Itself and Victory over Itself by Faith in Works, 1:130, 147, 149, 160, 173; The Sword of the Wicked, in Works 1:105; and The Returning Backslider, in Works 2:416. Clearly, like many others, Sibbes at times considered affections and passions near synonyms. Yet at other times, he distinguished them. So Sibbes warned, "Our affections must not rise to become unruly passions, for then as a river that overfloweth the banks, they carry much slime and soil with them." The Soul's Conflict, in Works 1:159. Elsewhere Sibbes identified three kinds of love: affection, passion, and grace of love. Affection is natural, and passion is "the excess of the natural affection when it overflows its bound." He continued, "Grace is the rectifying of natural affection, and the elevating and raising it up to a higher object than nature can pitch on. The Spirit of God turns nature into grace, and works corruption and passion out of nature, and elevates and raises that which is naturally good, the affection of love to be a grace of love. He raiseth it up to love God (which nature cannot discover), by spiritualizing of it. He makes it the most excellent grace of all. So that while I speak of the love of God, think not that I speak of mere affection, but of the affection that hath the stamp of grace upon it. For affections are graces when they are sanctified." A Glance of Heaven, in Works 4:192). Sibbes differently described passions as unruly, sinful, carnal, deformed, and base. Soul's Conflict, in Works, 1:160, 167, 168; Bruised Reed, in Works, 1:82; The Returning Backslider, in Works 2:412. Elsewhere he contrasted the "affection . . . called Love" with the "irregular agitations, and endless motions of the minds of ambitious, voluptuous, and covetous persons." Richard Sibbes and John Davenport, preface to John Preston, The Breast-Plate of Faith and Love, 6th ed. (London: George Purflow, 1651), v.

<sup>110</sup> Soul's Conflict, in Works, 1:168. Also see Bruised Reed, 78-83. Judgment is vital in Sibbes's understanding of the changed will. Judgment is akin to taste. The Spirit changes believers' "taste of the soul," to "savour" spiritual things "so deeply, that all other things should be out of relish." Bruised Reed, 78. Also see Bowels Opened, in Works, 2:10; Compare Frost, "Bruised Reed," 88-90.

<sup>111</sup> Breast-plate, 3:97. Later Preston said, "Great sinnes come from great passions, and men are able to see them, and when the passion is gone over, they are easily recalled againe." Ibid., 3:238. Preston not only specialized his divinity studies both in medieval Scholastics like Aquinas and Reformers like Calvin, but also declared Richard Sibbes as a mentor. Beeke and Pederson, Meet the Puritans, 488-93; John Smith, "Editor's Introduction," in WJE 2:63-64. In Religious Affections, Edwards cited three different works of Preston's, including The Golden Sceptre. Perry Miller said that Preston read Aquinas' Summa while receiving haircuts. Peter J. Thuesen, "Editor's Introduction," in Jonathan Edwards, Catalogues of Books, vol. 26 of The Works of Jonathan Edwards (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2008), 6n6. The edition of Breast-plate used for this paper was

Reynolds (1599-1676) distinguished mental, sensitive, and rational passions. Mental passions are "high, pure, and abstracted delights" grounded in the understanding and having little contamination by "earthly faculties." Sensitive passions are base affections similar to those found in beasts. The "middle" or "rational" passions are the rational control of the understanding and will over sensitive passions. 113 William Fenner (1600-1640) similarly wrote.

I know Aristotle and most of our divines too, doe place the affections in the sensitive part of the Soul, and not in the will, because they are to be seen in the beasts. But this cannot be so, for a man's affections do more stirre at a shame or disgrace; which could not be, if the affections were in the unreasonable sensitive part: the unreasonable sensitive part of a man is not sensible of credit or esteem: call the desires of the appetite greedy and gluttonish; the appetite is sensitive of any disgrace, and therefore the affections must needs be in the heart: the Scripture places the affections in the heart or the will. 114

Though he did not stress the distinction, Thomas Shepard (1605-1649) anticipated that in the age to come all carnal affections will be taken away: "[t]he Lord shall then take away all fleshly appetites or desires; for then our bodies shall be spiritual bodies."115 Thomas Manton (1620-1677), whose sermons would prove especially helpful to a young Jonathan Edwards, also saw the difference between "the sensitive stirring of the affections," that do "strike upon the senses," and the soul's "solid complacency" or "supreme and prevailing delight . . . in spiritual things." <sup>116</sup> For Manton, affection for God was movement of the higher soul. Once again echoing the Scholastic understanding of the human soul, he said,

In loving, fearing, praising, serving God, the noblest faculties are exercised, in the noblest and most regular way of operation: the soul is in the right temper and constitution; they are the highest actions of the highest faculties, elevated by the highest principles, about the highest objects. The objects are God, Christ, Heaven, the great things of eternity. The principles are the love and fear of God, the faculties, understanding, and will, not sensitive appetite; these exercised in thinking of God, and choosing God. 117

The Reformed Scholastic Francis Turretin (1623-1687) and the Scottish Presbyterian Thomas Boston (1676-1732) also maintained the distinction between a higher intellectual and lower sensitive

composed of three parts or volumes. The page number for the first two parts was continuous, whereas the page numbering for the third part or volume started with 1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>112</sup>Edwards Reynolds, A Treatise on the Passions and Faculties of the Soul of Man, vol. 6 of The Works of Edwards Reynolds, ed. Alexander Chalmers (Morgan, Pa.: Soli Deo Gloria Publications, 1996), 31. Reynolds's Treatise was often used in undergraduate classes at Oxford until the early eighteenth century. Beeke and Pederson, Meet the Puritans, 496-500. <sup>113</sup>Ibid., 32-33.

<sup>114</sup>William Fenner, A Treatise of the Affections; or The Souls Pulse (London: A.M., 1650), 4. Fiering calls Fenner's Treatise, "possibly the most significant work on the passions that emerged English Puritanism." Moral Philosophy, 159. For Fenner, affections are proper to the will. Indeed, the sensitive soul's appetite is analogical to those affections of the will. "But," Fenner continued, "the Lord doth not call for these sensitive passions to be seated upon him." Affections, 4; italics mine.

<sup>115</sup>Thomas Shepard, The Parable of the Ten Virgins Opened and Applied (Orlando, Fla.: Soli Deo Gloria Publications, 1990), 531. Also see Fulcher, "Puritans and the Passions," 132-34. As a pastor, Shepard confronted the nature of true religion, and, given these concerns, Shepard greatly influenced Edwards's own writings. In fact, in Affections Edwards cited Shepards's famous Parable of the Ten Virgins Opened and Applied more than any other work. For more on Shepard and Parable, see Randall C. Gleason, "The Parable of the Ten Virgins by Thomas Shepard (1605-1649), in Kapic and Gleason, The Devoted Life, 123-37; Beeke and Pederson, Meet the Puritans, 524-30; and Walton, Jonathan Edwards, 91-100.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>116</sup>Thomas Manton, One Hundred and Ninety Sermons on the Hundred and Nineteenth Psalm, 3 vols. (London: William Brown, 1842), 1:120. Also see ibid., 1:326, 344, 346, 401, 474, and especially 393-94. Manton wrote, "All the affections depend upon pleasure or pain, delight or grief (the one is proper to the body, the other to the soul) which grow from contentment or distaste which we receive from the divers objects which we meet with." Manton concluded, "delight sets all the other affections a-work." Ibid., 1:138. For Manton, the "spiritual appetite" or "gracious appetite" in true believers is drawn toward "the sincere milk of the word." Ibid., 1:174. See ibid., 109. Manton said, "There is a great deal of difference between serious desires, and passionate expressions." Ibid., 145. Compare ibid., 1:262, 342-51, 361-62. For Edwards's references to Manton, see W7E 16:758, 774, 776.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>117</sup>Ibid., 1:449. Compare ibid., 1:566.

soul. 118 The Puritan and Reformed tradition generally maintained a distinction between the appetites of the sensitive and intellectual parts of human beings.

The Reformed tradition, like Calvin and Melanchthon, also drew a close identification between affections or love and the will or heart. For instance, the phrase "the will and affections" often surfaces in their writings. 119 According to John Preston, affections are "the diverse motions and turnings of the will." He continued,

As the will turnes it selfe this way and that way; so a man is said to be effected, to love or to hate, to grieve or to rejoyce. Now love is this act of the will, whereby it turnes it selfe to a thing, as hatred is that whereby it turnes it selfe from a thing. ... Love is nothing else, but a disposition of the will, whereby it cleaves or makes forwards to some good that is agreeable to it selfe. 120

Though distinguishing the will and affections, Reynolds nevertheless closely connected the affections to the will, describing them as "the chief subjects to the will." William Fenner taught that the affections were the motions of the will. 122 Manton said that the heart is the seat of the affections. 123 He also identified affections with the will, teaching that the Spirit of God gives Christians a new nature that has an accompanying appetite for holiness. Manton explained, "Desires being the vigorous bent of the soul, discover the temper of it. The carnal nature puts forth itself in lustings, so doth the new nature. The main thing we have by grace is a new heart, that is, new loves, new desires, and new delights." 124 Jonathan Edwards later used this connection between "will and affections" when he taught in Religious *Affections* that the affections are merely the stronger movements of the will.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>118</sup>Francis Turretin, *Institutes of Elenctic Theology*, trans. George Musgrave Giger, ed. James T. Dennison, Jr. (Phillipsburg, N.I.: P&R Publishing, 1994), §13.14.3 (2:353). Turretin was an intellectualist: he said the will followed the dictates of the practical intellect. Elenctic Theology, §10.2.5 (1:662). Turretin followed Aquinas's psychological model, though he rejected the Scholastic doctrine of propassions. Ibid., §11.21.10 (2:136). All references to Turretin's Elenctic Theology will include the topic, question, and section, followed by the volume and page number for the Giger-Dennison edition in parenthesis. For Thomas Boston, Human Nature in Its Fourfold State (Carlisle, Pa.: The Banner of Truth Trust, 1964), 43. Boston understood holiness to refer to the "purity and good order of the affections." In 1747 Jonathan Edwards wrote in a letter to Thomas Gillespie, "I have read [Mr. Boston's] Fourfold State of Man, and liked it exceeding well. I think he therein shows himself to be a truly great divine." Letters and Personal Writings, vol. 16 of The Works of Jonathan Edwards, ed. George S. Claghorn (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1998), 235.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>119</sup>For example, Sibbes, Bruised Reed, in Works 1:80; John Preston, The Golden Sceptre Held Forth to the Humble (London: Religious Tract Society, 1837), 89, 104; Shepard, The Parable of the Ten Virgins Opened and Applied (Orlando, Fla.: Soli Deo Gloria Publications, 1990), 320; and Boston, Four-fold State, 84.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>120</sup>Breast-plate, 3:6. Preston said: "For what are affections, but divers positions and situations of the will, and the feet it walks upon? They are but the divers motions and inclinations whereby the will shoots itself into the objects of it. Now look, which way thy will is resolved and set, that way are thy affections set also." Golden Sceptre, 104. The heart's train begins with the understanding, followed by the will, followed by the affections, which leads to action. Breast-plate, 2:203-4. See ibid., 3:136-37; 3:215.

<sup>121</sup>Reynolds, Treatise, 39.

<sup>122</sup>Fenner formally defined affections as "forcible and sensible motions of the will, to a thing or from a thing, according as it is apprehended to be evil or to be good." Fenner, Affections, 7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>123</sup>Manton, Hundred and Nineteenth Psalm, 1:153. Also see ibid., 1:329, 565.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>124</sup>Ibid., 1:42. Also see ibid., 1:105, 107, 138, 151, 154-55, 343-44. Manton often emphasized the will like a voluntarist (for example, see ibid., 1:474, 570, 574), but in other places he presented an intellectualist position. For example, he said (in a passage noteworthy for more than intellectualism), "Now man rightly constituted, his actions are thus governed: the understanding and conscience prescribed to the will; the will, according to right reason and conscience, moveth the affections: the affections, according to the command and counsel of the will, move the bodily spirits and members of the body. But by corruption there is a manifest inversion and change; pleasures affect the senses, the senses corrupt the phantasy, phantasy moveth the bodily spirits they the affections; and by their violence the will is carried captive, man blinded, and so man goeth headlong to his own destruction." Ibid., 1:447. Compare ibid., 1:326.

In general, the Puritan Reformed tradition insisted that affections were good and even necessary for true and vital religion. Sibbes advocated a form of Christian piety that made much of the affections:125

God hath made the soul for a communion with himself, which communion is especially placed in the affections, which are the springs of all spiritual worship. Then the affections are well ordered, when we are fit to have communion with God, to love, joy, trust, to delight in him above all things. The affections are the inward movings of the soul, which then move best when they move us to God, not from him. They are the feet of the soul, whereby we walk with, and before God. 126

Sibbes insisted that first "[o]ur disposition must be changed" through regeneration before individuals can ever love their Maker. 127 "Indeed," Sibbes wrote, "religion is mainly in the affections, whereof there is excellent use. Take away them, and take away all religion whatsoever."128 John Preston seated justifying faith not merely in the understanding, but also in the will and affections. God alone can change a person's will and affections so that saving faith can be exercised. 129 Reynolds taught that love for God should be boundless. 130 Fenner said that God requires the heart's affections to be set upon him. Such affections must be "forcible." <sup>131</sup> In Parable, Shepard argued that in conversion, the whole soul, including the "affections and will," come to Christ. 132 Even so, for Shepard, the important point was not whether there are affections for God, but the nature of those affections. 133 Likewise, Thomas Watson (1620-1686) insisted that, for people to bring God glory, they direct affection to God. Affections must be "[e]xuberant, not a few drops but a stream," "superlative," and "intense and ardent." For Manton,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>125</sup>Mark Dever and Ronald N. Frost both emphasize Sibbes's "affective theology." See Mark Dever, *Richard Sibbes:* Puritanism and Calvinism in Late Elizabethan and Early Stuart England (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 2000), 135-60; Ronald N. Frost, "The Bruised Reed by Richard Sibbes (1577-1635)," in The Devoted Life: An Invitation to the Puritan Classics, ed. Kelly M. Kapic and Randall C. Gleason (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 2004),79-91. On the relationship of Sibbes and Edwards's views of the signs of true piety, see Walton, Jonathan Edwards, 81-82.

<sup>126</sup> Soul's Conflict, in Works 1:159. Sibbes continued, "It is the glory of a Christian to be carried with full sail, and as it were with the spring-tide of affections." Ibid., 1:160.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>127</sup>Bruised Reed, in Works, 1:80. Sibbes wrote, "The same Spirit that enlighteneth the mind, inspireth gracious inclinations into the will and affections, and infuseth into the whole man." Ibid., 1:82.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>128</sup>The Returning Backslider in Works, 2:368. Compare Sibbes's counsel elsewhere: "Labour we, therefore, every day more and more to have larger and larger affections to Christ." Bowels Opened: Being Expository Sermons on Cant. IV.16, V., VI., in Works 2:126. Sibbes said, "Our affections shew what we are in religion." A Glance of Heaven; or, A Precious Taste of a Glorious Feast, in Works 4:182 (to which Grosart, the editor Sibbes's works, affixed a note directing the reading to compare "President Edwards' treatise on 'The Religious Affections'"). On the connection between heart and will and affections in Sibbes's thought, see Dever, Richard Sibbes, 142-44.

<sup>129</sup>Ibid., 1:86. Preston said, "[W]hen God comes to teach a thing he boweth the will and affections to doe it." Ibid., 1:87. Elsewhere Preston wrote, "[T]he affections are such things as the Lord only can meddle with." Preston, *Golden Sceptre*, 14. Preston also argued that love is "necessary to salvation." *Breast-plate*, 3:18.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>130</sup>Reynolds wrote, "And thus we are to love him above all things; first, 'appretiative,' setting a higher price upon his glory and command, than upon anything besides; all, dung in comparison. Secondly, 'intensive,' with the greatest force and intention of our spirit, setting no bounds or measure of our love to him. Thirdly, 'adæquate,' as the complete, perfect, and adequate object of all our love, in whom it must begin, and in whom it must end. And therefore the Wise man, speaking of the love and fear of God, tells us, that it is "totum hominis," the whole of man." Treatise, 62.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>131</sup>Affections, 5. Fenner referred to the affections of the will as "sensible motions" that carry along the soul's lower faculties and the "humours and parts of the body." Affections, 6. For Fenner, "God is the principle object of our affections." Not setting affections on God is a "wofull" sin. For this reason Fenner encouraged ministers to "stir up the affections of mens hearts," by the Word of God, which is itself full of affections. Ibid., 46, 105, 90; compare ibid., 94.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>132</sup>Parable, 320. Elsewhere Shepard wrote, "[T]he whole soul by faith comes again to God by Christ. The mind sees, the affections make after him, will fastens on him, and there depends." Ibid., 112. Compare ibid., 323. Also see E. Brooks Holifield, Theology in America: Christian Thought from the Age of the Puritans to the Civil War (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2003), 34.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>133</sup>Ibid., 193, 326, 331, 35, 364-66, 455, 634. In this sense, Shepard anticipates Edwards.

<sup>134</sup>Thomas Watson, A Body of Practical Divinity, in a Series of Sermons on the Shorter Catechism (Aberdeen: George King and Robert King, 1838), 19.

every faculty—the understanding, will, and affections— must "express love to God." People should obey God from a spirit "seething hot," with "affections . . . so strong, that they boil over in our lives." 136 Manton said religious acts greatly depend on "the vigour of affections." 137 Turretin likewise insisted that human affections must be God's to love him. 138 Justifying faith includes "the most fervent affection and zeal." 139 Christ in his kingly office reigns over the affections of believers, though saints continue to struggle against them. 140 Yet God's grace must change the understanding, will, and affections before an individual can receive the word of God by faith.<sup>141</sup> Thomas Boston taught that in regeneration there is a happy change made on the affections: they are both rectified and regulated. "[G]race," Boston said, "raises the affections where they are too low. It gives the chief seat in them to God, and pulls down all other rivals."142

Finally, these themes arise in the favorite theologian of Jonathan Edwards, Peter van Mastricht (1630-1706) and his *Theoretico-Practica Theologia*.  $^{143}$  Like other Protestants, Mastricht saw faith as "always joined with a certain pious affection towards God," and this affection of faith, conquering the world, is "transcendental to God and spiritual things." <sup>144</sup> Faith is the "first act of life, in which the whole man lives spiritually," and involves all the faculties: intellect, will, and affections. 145 Faith quickens human affections through the will to love God and goodness, to rejoice and to hate. Affections are considered an act (actus), not a passion. 146 This faith was possible after regeneration, which in turn

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>135</sup>Manton, Hundred and Nineteenth Psalm, 1:21-22. Compare ibid., 1:14, 125-26, 303, 579. Among the other echoes of Manton's thought found in Edwards include the notion that in the study of the word of God there is "a sweetness" or "delightful taste." Ibid., 1:118.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>136</sup>Ibid., 1:38. Also see ibid., 1:39, 175, 178.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>137</sup>Ibid., 1:79.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>138</sup>Turretin, Elenctic Theology, §12.2.27 (2:184).

<sup>139</sup>Ibid., §15.15.7 (2:590).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>140</sup>Ibid., §14.5.8 (2:393); §15.16.30 (2:608). Compare §15.3.25 (2:517). Elsewhere, Turretin said, "Sanctification necessarily follows saving faith because it purifies the heart (Acts 15:9) and is efficacious through love (Gal 5:6). So pathetically (pathetice) does it represent the incredible love of God towards us and the supreme love of Christ dying that it inflames the believer with a mutual love of his most kind Savior, so that he thinks nothing is preferable to living and dying again for him." Ibid., §15.15.9 (2:591).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>141</sup>Ibid., §15.4.33 (2:534). "Cùm ergo apertio ista significet obstaculorum omnium, quæ Verbi ingressum & fructum impediebant, remotionem, quæ tam in mente & voluntate, quàm in affectibus occurrebant, à gratia necessariò fieri debuit distinctè à Verbo." Fransisco Turrettino, Institutio Theologiæ Elencticæ (Geneva: Samuelem de Tournes, 1682), 2:582.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>142</sup>Four-fold State, 219. Also see ibid., 217.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>143</sup>Edwards to Reverend Joseph Bellamy, Northampton, January 15, 1746/7, in WJE 16:216-18. Edwards wrote his young protégé, "But take Mastricht for divinity in general, doctrine, practice, and controversy; or as an universal system of divinity; and it is much better than Turretin or any other book in the world, excepting the Bible, in my opinion" (WJE 16:217). For Cotton Mather's assessment of Mastricht, see Brandon Withrow, introduction to Peter van Mastricht, A Treatise on Regeneration, (1769; repr., Morgan, Pa.: Soli Deo Gloria Publications, 2002), xxix. On the life of Peter van Mastricht, see Adriaan Cornelis Neele, The Art of Living to God: A Study of Method and Piety in the Theoretico-Practica Theologia of Peter van Mastricht (1630-1706), Perspectives on Christianity, 8th ser., vol. 1 (Pretoria: University of Pretoria, 2005), 35-63, and Withrow, introduction to Regeneration, viii-xv.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>144</sup>Semper conjuncta est cum pio quodam *affectu* versus Deum (Rom 4:20). Insuper 3. vincit mundum & mundana (1 Jo 5:4), quatenus affectum ciet transcendentalem, versus Deum & spiritualia." Peter van Mastricht, Theoretico-Practica Theologia, qua Per singula capita Theologia, pars exegetica, dogmatica, elenchtica & practica, perpetua successione conjugantur (Utrecht: W. Van de Water, J. v. Poolsum, J. Wagens, G. v. Paddenburg, 1724), Moralis §2.2.3 (1221). References to Mastricht's Theologia will give the book, chapter, and section, followed by the page number. The subsequent *Idea Theologia Moralis* part restarts its book numbering with one, but is not cited.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>145</sup>Theoretica-Practica Theologia, §2.1.8 (52). Also see Neele, Art, 115-19.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>146</sup>See Theoretica-Practica Theologia, §2.1.10 (52). Also see Neele, Art, 127. Neele argues that Mastricht "broadens the [Amesian] definition [of faith] with respect to the intellect and affections," whereas Mastricht's contemporaries saw intellect and affections to be central but separate acts in faith. Ibid., 127-28.

brings spiritual life to "the whole man," including "understanding, will, affections, sensitive faculties, and so forth, that all may be quickened and renewed thereby."147

Mastricht taught that, while regeneration illumines the understanding so that it may apprehend the truth and goodness of spiritual objects, the regenerative work is seated in the will or heart, through which the Spirit of God "implants" a "new inclination or propensity towards spiritual good." 148 Regeneration also begins to restore the mind's rule over the passions, which are connected to the "inferior faculties common to brutes," thereby influencing even "members of the body." <sup>149</sup> In his discussion of faith, Mastricht described the affections as acts, and he regards affections as passions of the sensitive appetite. The will of the regenerate has "a new propensity towards spiritual objects." As a result, their affections and passions are more spiritually orientated. A similar distinction is found in Mastricht's explanation of God's will and affections. Echoing traditional theology, he taught divine impassibility, as God is both incorporeal and active. 150 Nevertheless the impassible God does will, and as the affections of God may describe the effects of the eternal and immutable divine will, Mastricht called on believers to conform their own affections—the acts of their will or "rational appetite"—with the "affections of God." Believers should not only change their affections, but they should also subject their passions under the divine will.<sup>151</sup>

#### Conclusion

Most contemporary understandings of emotions have little in common with the portrait of affections and passions presented here. Emotions are not considered inclinations or aversions of the soul and are never distinguished between higher and lower movements. They are most often understood as bodily feelings largely outside a person's control, contrary to a traditional Christian understanding of human affectivity. 152

From the earliest days of post-apostolic Christianity until the time of Jonathan Edwards, Christian teachers of widely varying theological traditions approached affections and passions as movements of the soul. At the most basic level, the affections and passions were understood as inclinations or aversions. With widespread and near agreement, the various doctors distinguished between the higher and lower appetites of the soul and the movements that corresponded to them. This distinction is clearly seen in the constant affirmation of divine impassibility and the reality of divine love. Moreover, throughout the premodern church, a host of theologians distinguished explicitly between rational and sensitive appetite. Sometimes Christian teachers also distinguished them nominally, in which the movements of the rational appetite were called *affections* and the movements of the sensitive appetite passions. Affections were seen as acts or movements of the will toward and away from rational or spiritual good and evil. The passions occur when the subject is affected by an external object, at which point the passions themselves act upon the will to entice it toward earthly or sensory good.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>147</sup>Mastricht, Regeneration, 13. Mastricht defined regeneration as "that physical operation of the Holy Ghost whereby he begets in men who are elected, redeemed, and externally called, the first act or principle of spiritual life, by which they are enables to receive the offered Redeemer, and comply with the conditions of salvation." Ibid., 13. On the practical understanding and the will, which were very close to Edwards's own view, see ibid., 39-42. The Treatise on Regeneration is a portion of the Theoretico-Practica Theologia translated into English.

<sup>148</sup>Ibid., 23.

<sup>149</sup>Ibid., 25-26.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>150</sup>Mastricht, Theorectica-Practica Theologia, §2.15.32 (166-67).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>151</sup>Ibid., §2.15.40 (168-69). Also see §2.15.19 (161).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>152</sup> See my discussion of different contemporary approaches to emotions. Martin, "Affections and Passions," 18-26.

Although different accounts were given for the problem of the will and its freedom, the affections and passions were not considered to be outside one's volition per se. Christian theologians believed passions to be unruly, requiring the control of the rational faculties. When passions rule in an individual, that person was controlled by passions willingly. Seated in the soul, passions were often believed to have accompanying effects on the body, but these effects were considered distinct from the passion itself.

By the time of the Puritans and the Reformed Scholastics, the affections were seen as the positive movements of the soul, often in connection with the will. By definition a genuine believer's will and affections flowed towards God. Because humanity is utterly depraved, changed affections could only come through God's grace and the regenerating work of the Spirit of God. People are unable in themselves to change their will toward God. Following the teaching of Calvin and Melanchthon, faith included changed affections or inclinations toward the triune God and away from sin. As time went on, more and more attention was given to the problem of counterfeit affections. Some professing believers showed signs of having such changed affections, only eventually to show themselves to be mere hypocrites. Such pastoral problems came to a head during the "Great Awakening" and evoked responses from a young Massachusetts minister of that time, Jonathan Edwards—one who already had a keen philosophical and theological interest in affections. These responses eventually culminated in the publication of his classic treatment on the subject, Religious Affections.