

What in The World is a Worldview? Examining Metaphysics as Necessary for Biblical Theology

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Introduction

The evangelical world is saturated with the concept(s) of worldview.¹ The landscape of evangelicalism now encompasses worldview centers, academies, camps, and graduate programs, all dedicated to promoting a Christian worldview.² This term is often used as an apologetic-pedagogical device, attempting to teach people to distinguish Christianity from other world-organizing conceptions such as religions or philosophical movements. This popular evangelical understanding of worldview originated in the 1970s with Francis Schaeffer³ and has since gained in popularity and fervor.⁴ David Naugle, a leading Christian philosopher in this field, goes so far as to say that “conceiving Christianity as a worldview has been one of the most significant developments in the recent history of the church.”⁵ At the same time, definitions and referents for this concept remain ambiguous, at best. The term “Christian Worldview” was “nearly non-existent in English language publishing” before the 1960s.⁶ Before that, worldview was mainly relegated to the philosophical realm, specifically German idealism. Noted rhetoric scholar Mark Ward Sr. believes that a “Christian worldview,” and its appellation “biblical worldview,” is nothing more than an ethnographic symbolic speech code, or “cognitive schemata,” for American evangelicalism, leading to binary and reductionistic modes of thought.⁷ He argues that

¹ E.g., Graham A. Cole, *What is a Christian Worldview* in the *Restless Minds Series*, ed. Don Carson (Bellingham, WA: Lexham Press, 2022); Josh Mulvihill, *Biblical Worldview: What it is, Why it Matters, and How to Shape the Worldview of the Next Generation* (Roanoke, VA: Renewanation, 2019); Joel Beeke, ed., *The Beauty and Glory of the Christian Worldview* (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2017); David S. Dockery and Trevin K. Wax, eds. *The Christian Worldview Handbook* (Nashville: Holman Reference, 2019); Philip Graham Ryken, *What is the Christian Worldview?* (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishers, 2006); W. Gary Phillips ed., *Making Sense of Your World: A Biblical Worldview* (Salem Lakes, WI: Sheffield Publishing Co., 2008).

² E.g., Center for Biblical Worldview at Bob Jones University; The Center for Biblical Worldview at the Family Research Council, Washington DC; Worldview Academy, Mt. Pleasant, TX; Worldview Week at Pine Haven Christian Assembly, Park Rapids, MN; Master of Arts (Theology) in Biblical Worldview, Central Baptist Theological Seminary of Minneapolis. The idea of worldview has also permeated Christian pedagogy. See Roger C. S. Erdvig, “A Model for Biblical Worldview Development in Evangelical Christian Emerging Adults,” *Journal of Research on Christian Education* 29 no. 3 (2020): 285–306, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10656219.2020.1816517>. Octavio Javier Esqueda, “Biblical Worldview: The Christian Higher Education Foundation for Learning,” *Christian Higher Education* 13 no 2 (2014): 91–100.

³ *How Should We Then Live? The Rise and Decline of Western Thought and Culture* (New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1976).

⁴ Highlights of these evangelical developments include Francis Shaeffer, *A Christian Manifesto* (Wheaton: Crossway, 1981); Arthur F. Holmes, *Contours of a Christian Worldview* (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1983); James W. Sire, *The Universe Next Door: A Basic Worldview Catalog* (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1997); *Naming the Elephant: Worldview as a Concept* (Grand Rapids: InterVarsity Press, 2015).

David K. Naugle, *Worldview: The History of a Concept* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002); Nancy Pearcey, *Total Truth: Liberating Christianity from its Cultural Captivity* (Wheaton: Crossway, 2004); John MacArthur, *Think Biblically! Recovering a Christian Worldview* (Wheaton: Crossway, 2009).

⁵ Naugle, *Worldview: The History of a Concept*, 4.

⁶ Michelle Sanchez, “Orr and Kant: An Analysis of the Intellectual Encounter Behind ‘The Christian Worldview,’” *Scottish Journal of Theology* no 74 (2021): 103, fn 2, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0036930621000296>.

⁷ “‘Christian Worldview’: A Defining Symbolic Term of the American Evangelical Speech Code,” *Journal of Communication and Religion* 46 no. 3 (2023): 23.

it “functions as a bearer of culture that literally incorporates all the dimensions of American evangelical knowledge.”⁸ In other words, a “Christian worldview” is simply an evangelical code for “you’re one of us and not one of them.” The evangelical concept of worldview is ambiguously defined at best, yet it is definitively applied.

Because the concept of worldview has permeated evangelical theology, various disciplines have adopted or adapted it to justify their methodological foundations against other views. Systematics, for example, is easily connected to the prevailing apologetical understanding and uses of worldview. D. A. Carson believes that systematic theology itself is “worldview forming,” and “is likely to exercise significant influence on the disciplines that nurture it.”⁹ But what about biblical theology? How are worldview and biblical theology related?¹⁰ In many ways, this remains to be seen.

While the evangelical understandings and uses of “worldview” could be examined and extrapolated *ad nauseam*, the purposes of this essay are more modest: to identify the complexity and misunderstandings of worldview and apply these to theology. In doing so, I will demonstrate that many evangelical concepts of worldview are mistaken and have attempted to divorce interpretation and theology from metaphysics. A proper understanding of worldview reflects a complex social metaphysic that is deeply intertwined with philosophy. This thesis will be supported in three ways. First, I will examine the philosophies of Immanuel Kant and Wilhelm Dilthey to articulate the concept of worldview and situate it within its philosophical, specifically metaphysical, context. Second, I will describe the evangelical adaptation and changes in James Orr. Third, I will evaluate the current definitions of worldview in James Sire, David Naugle, and Charles Taylor. After the evaluation, I will examine current religious uses of worldview. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, I will demonstrate that a proper understanding of worldview helps in seeing the necessity of metaphysics in theology, particularly in biblical theology.

Philosophy and *Weltanschauung*

Kant

Immanuel Kant faced a problem. Descartes’ mind-body dualism led to a series of questions for early modern philosophers, specifically how the subject can have correct knowledge of the object when everything except personal existence must be doubted. For Kant, the question wasn’t simply in the realm of epistemology but was anchored to ethics and morality. If there is a clear distinction between the phenomenal and noumenal—between how the person perceives an experience and the thing itself—how can one trust their reflective judgments? Furthermore, if a person can only focus on one experience with observable sequences, how can they understand the whole as a system? These questions relate to aesthetics, as seen in Kant’s third *Critique*. If mere observation is the epistemological ground, how can someone judge something as beautiful or sublime? More appropriately, how can someone judge something to be infinite when infinity cannot be observed? What Kant referred to as the “bare capability” or “sensible” thinking cannot comprehend things outside of phenomena.¹¹ This thinking must be

⁸ Mark Ward Sr., “From a Christian Perspective” in *News on the Right: Studying Conservative News Cultures*, ed. by M. Nadler and A.J. Bauder (Oxford University Press, 2020): 28.

⁹ “Systematic Theology and Biblical Theology,” in the *New Dictionary of Biblical Theology* (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1988), 102.

¹⁰ I appreciate Eric Newton’s introduction to the *Journal of Biblical Theology and Worldview* 1 no. 1 (2020): 1–8, particularly pgs. 6–7.

¹¹ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, trans. J. H. Bernard (London: MacMillan, 1914), 105 (AA5).

“supersensible,” transcending the observational phenomena. Yet, anything supersensible must presuppose a system – some grid that is both *a priori* and entirely known.

For it is only by means of this [faculty in the human mind that is itself supersensible] and its idea of a noumenon, which itself admits of no intuition though it presupposes as the substratum of the *Weltanschauung*, that the infinite of the world of sense, in the pure intellectual estimation of magnitude, can be completely comprehended under a concept, although in the mathematical estimation of magnitude by means of concepts of number it can never be completely thought.¹²

Just as any measurement presumes a standard, any phenomenal judgment must presume a comprehensive whole into which it fits. This *Grundmaß*, or point of reference, must be understood as an immediate entirety.¹³ In his *Opus Postumum*, Kant further described mankind as both an inhabitant of his world and a judge of it; he is “a *cosmotheoros* [*Welbeschauer*] who creates the elements of knowledge of the world himself, *a priori*, from which he, as, at the same time, an inhabitant of the world, constructs [*zimmern*] a world-vision [*Weltanschauung*] in the idea.”¹⁴ Here Kant fully embraces the circle of Platonic idealism. A person both builds a worldview and automatically intuits a worldview. If observational phenomena were bricks, the person is inherently, from birth, a bricklayer. In the case of aesthetics, Da Vinci painted the beautiful Mona Lisa, not only by looking at Gherardini, but also because he already knew what beauty was. His canvas matched the ideal because of that inherent knowledge, though it was painted in the style of the Italian Renaissance because he was born in fifteenth-century Italy. This also applies to the good and the true. An understanding of *Weltanschauung* arises from natural and conscious testing of coherence in one’s experience that must also presume its categories.¹⁵ It is an intuition about the world from within the world. It acknowledges that experience and perception are instrumental in the phenomenal.

This kind of endeavor, or “transcendental philosophy,” is necessary. Without it, as Kant said, no one has a “concept as to how, and by what principle, one could design the plan of a system, by which a coherent whole could be established as rational knowledge for reason.”¹⁶ It “precedes the assertion of things that are thought, as their archetype, in which they must be set.”¹⁷ For Kant, *Weltanschauung* isn’t about seeing the world a certain way, nor is it simply a specific philosophy. It’s about “orienting oneself relative to the world”¹⁸ by grounding philosophies in experience sourced from a holistic, systematic, and ready-to-hand intuition.¹⁹

¹² Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, 105 (AA5).

¹³ Alexander T. Englert, “The Conceptual Origin of Worldview in Kant and Fichte,” *Journal of Transcendental Philosophy* 4 no. 1:3. See also, Margarita Arutyuntan, “Immanuel Kant at the Origins of the Conceptualization of the ‘Worldview’ Phenomenon,” *Journal of Transcendental Philosophy* 20 no. 3: 20–26.

¹⁴ Trans. Eckart Föster and Michael Rosen (Cambridge University Press, 1993), 235 (21:31).

¹⁵ Englert, “The Conceptual Origin of Worldview in Kant and Fichte,” 7.

¹⁶ *Opus Postumum*, 256 (21:7).

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ Englert, “The Conceptual Origin of Worldview in Kant and Fichte,” 8.

¹⁹ Kant sometimes refers to this idea as understanding [*Verstand*] or comprehension [*Begreifen*]. Rudolph Makreel connects Kant’s understanding of worldview with comprehension: “In the final analysis, we can think of a worldview as a way of compensating for the fact that we do not have archetypal or absolute intellectual powers. Our understanding functions ectypally by proceeding from part to part in building up a systematic approximation of the whole of reality. Because determinant judgment leads us only part of the way in understanding

Kant's *Weltanschauung* also had theological applications, as his evolution in appreciating metaphysics is well-documented.²⁰ Initially, Kant denounced traditional metaphysics as both necessary and intolerable. In the preface to the first edition of *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781), Kant opened by saying, "Human reason has this particular fate that in one species of its knowledge it is burdened by questions which, as prescribed by the very nature of reason itself, it is not able to ignore, but which, as transcending all its powers, it is also not able to answer."²¹ Metaphysics, as he continued, was once the "Queen of all the sciences," and ruled her "despotic" government with the administration of the dogmatists.²² Like his own *Sitz im Leben*, Kant believed the monarchy of classical metaphysics must be reformed by rejecting reason "independently of all experience."²³ This reformation was Kant's task. He argued that observational knowledge cannot be extended into the supersensible realm of metaphysics, as previously described. The mind is limited and too dependent upon experience. *A priori* knowledge independent of the mind is impossible (contra rationalism), nor is the mind a *tabula rasa* (contra empiricism).

Human experience is necessary for applicable metaphysics, but also includes *a priori* presumptions. It's not either-or, but both-and. Metaphysics isn't simply a philosophical category of essence; it is deeply connected to experience and understanding. Later, in his work *The Metaphysics of Morals* (1797), Kant described ethics and actions as derived from a supreme, *a priori* moral principle from which a life system could be derived. He said, "...there is a required system derived from reason which could be called the *metaphysics of right*. But since the concept of right is a pure concept that still looks to practice (application to cases that come up in experience), a *metaphysical system of right* would have to be taken to account, in its divisions.... But *what is empirical* cannot be divided completely."²⁴ We understand justice, not simply because of our experience but because we intuit it from a presumed ideal of justice. Instead of accepting classical Christian metaphysics, along with its proofs and prolegomena, Kant sought to ground metaphysics in human experience, all the while acknowledging one inescapable rational presumption: God "as a holy being, can have no comparison or superlative, there can be only one."²⁵ God does not represent a worldview, nor is a worldview necessarily directed towards God. *Weltanschauung* is dependent upon God, as any metaphysic must be grounded in something transcendent. Yet, Kant's *Weltanschauung* is also independent of God because it is a

the world, comprehension becomes a necessary supplement that allows us to have the world in a more holistic way. But comprehension is not a purely theoretical accomplishment, for it requires an accommodation with our practical goals. Comprehension was originally conceived in purely rational terms, but I have argued that Kant gradually reconceives it as a task for reflective judgment. This makes comprehension both this worldly and provisional enough to be an important stimulus for further human inquiry." *Kant's Worldview: How Judgment Shapes Human Comprehension* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2022), 245.

²⁰ The best examples are Edward Kanterian, *Kant, Metaphysics, and God: The Secret Thorn* (New York: Routledge, 2018) and George E. Michalson, *Kant and the Problem of God* (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 1999).

²¹ Trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: MacMillan, 1970), 7 (A vii).

²² Ibid., 8. "Metaphysics has accordingly lapsed back into the ancient time-worn dogmatism, and so again suffers that depreciation from which it was to have been rescued. And now, after all methods, so it is believed, have been tried and found wanting, the prevailing mood is that of weariness and complete indifferentism—the mother, in all sciences, of chaos and night, but happily in this case the source, or at least the prelude, of their approaching reform and restoration."

²³ Ibid., 9.

²⁴ Trans. Mary Gregor, in *Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy*, ed. Lara Denis (Cambridge University Press, 2017), 3 (6:205).

²⁵ Kant, *Opus Postumum*, 256 (21:7).

very human and experiential metaphysic. As Kant recognized the limitation of the senses, both noumena and phenomena, he also acknowledged the need for an Ideal. In his lecture notes, Kant said, “God alone can intuit objects *intellectualiter* [independent understanding], for they exist through him, and he is aware of his actions. But we cannot intuit them *intellectualiter*, for we can only have cognition of their existence insofar as they appear to us. I cannot intuit anything *originaliter* (as myself/apart from myself), but only derivatively, when something affects me.”²⁶ The key is not the metaphysical derivation from God; the key is that we can only intuit anything when it affects us, in our experience and authentic life. This is Kantian metaphysics as applied to his invention of worldview: not a view of the world but a connection to the world as its own metaphysic, ultimately sourced in God but proximally located in experience.

Dilthey

Although the concept of *Weltanschauung* underwent multiple iterations, particularly in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Wilhelm Dilthey, a noted historian and early psychologist, represented a significant development in understanding worldview. What Kant was to natural sciences, Dilthey was to social sciences. For him, worldview isn’t simply a dialectic between experience and *a priori* knowledge; it is something much more profound. In an article published at the time of his death, Dilthey described worldview as synonymous with life itself.

Life is the ultimate root of a world-view. Life is scattered over the earth in innumerable singular lives, and it is experienced anew in each individual. Because as a mere moment of the present, life eludes direct observation, it is retained in echoing memory. Yet it has objectified itself in its manifestations, the very depths of life are more completely graspable in understanding and interpretation than in any reflexive awareness or apprehension through our own hand.²⁷

Worldview is more than personal reflection; it is simultaneously innumerable and singular, individual and social, present and past, and “completely graspable.” It is less about categories and more about recognizing standard features in shared living. This is vital in understanding worldview; the idea that it is also a shared, communal reflection of reality. Life experiences result from, as Dilthey said, “the interconnectedness of individuals.”²⁸ Dilthey’s worldview is more of a life philosophy, “employing words such as life-stance (*Lebenshaltung*), life-intensification (*Lebenssteigerung*), life-formation (*Lebensgestaltung*).”²⁹ Knowledge and philosophy, no matter what shape they may take, can never be separated from life experiences. These experiences form “the foundation for the reality of the external world and from my relations to it.”³⁰ Additionally, Dilthey insists that these foundations, “some of the most important are that they limit my existence, exert a pressure on it that I cannot escape, and ...

²⁶ As seen in Kanterian, *Kant, Metaphysics, and God*, 370.

²⁷ “The Types of World-View and their Development in Metaphysical Systems,” trans. James McMahon and Rudolf Makkreel in *Ethical and World-View Philosophy, Wilhelm Dilthey, Selected Works, Vol. VI*, ed. Rudolf Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi (Princeton Publisher Press, 2017), 254 (79).

²⁸ Ibid., 255 (80).

²⁹ Eric S. Nelson, “Dilthey and Carnap: The Feeling of Life, the Scientific Worldview, and the Elimination of Metaphysics,” in *The Worlds of Positivism: A Global Intellectual History, 1770–1930*, ed. Johannes Feichtinger, Franz L. Fillafer, and Jan Surman (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave MacMillan, 2018), 326.

³⁰ Wilhelm Dilthey, “The Types of World-View and their Development in Metaphysical Systems,” 256 (80).

restrain my intentions in a way that was unexpected and that cannot be changed.”³¹ In other words, one cannot escape their worldview, because it is more than simply their outlook; it is their context, both observations and presumptions, individual and social. Even the inductive method, a cornerstone of modern philosophy and science, must be grounded in presuppositions.³² This aspect closely follows Kant’s experiential metaphysic. Dilthey, attempting to move even farther away from classical metaphysics than Kant did, inevitably arrives at a similar conclusion: there must be *a priori* realities that are intuited in life. People are not individual observers or knowers; they arise from and are part of something—traditions, an environment, philosophies, and presumptions. Individual objectivity is a myth – everything, because everyone, is historically situated. Everyone thinks within a “cultural domain,” as individuals are both part of and representatives of certain cultures. If it takes a village to raise a child, it takes a *Weltanschauung* to be a person.

Dilthey also distinguished three conceptual aspects of worldview, namely the religious, the literary/artistic, and the metaphysical threads within human experience. The religious thread conceives of life in terms of value and transcendence. Its life formation centers around understanding the incomprehensible and directing life accordingly.³³ The second, literary/artistic thread, “flowers under the influence of religion,” as its first subject matters are religious” encompassing the mediums of language and aesthetics. Universal life-moods arising from the shared experiences of a community are reflected in the “poetic consciousness of meaning.” This aspect first assumes that beauty and understanding are universal, and then focuses on personal experience. Finally, the category of metaphysics acts as the sum of the other two cultural concepts. Dilthey said, “When world-views are elevated to a conceptual coherence ... and claim to be universally valid, metaphysics comes into being. History shows that wherever metaphysics appears, religious development prepares the way for it, and that it is influenced by poetry or literature.”³⁴ In Dilthey, *Weltanschauung* adopts a historicizing aspect. Worldviews must be viewed through the lens of historical and cultural elements.

Though thoroughly modern and rejecting classic metaphysical categories, Dilthey, like Kant before him, could not escape the issue: any reflection or examination of life comes from a life-situation. Kant’s invention and Dilthey’s expansion of worldview are just two examples of modernity attempting to downplay classical metaphysics, only to invent a new kind of intuitive experiential metaphysics. “Every genuine world-view offers an intuitive insight that arises from being-immersed-in-life itself.”³⁵ Being in life means presuming certain things about life.³⁶

Kant shows us that a worldview is not about how we view the world; it’s about being a part of the world that we view. It’s not about seeing the world through a filter but recognizing that everyone has archetypal presumptions. If history is a river, we are not on the bank watching it go by. Everyone is a part of the river, and any attempted epistemological separation is akin to

³¹ Wilhelm Dilthey, “The Types of World-View and their Development in Metaphysical Systems,” 256 (80).

³² “Both the result of my inductions and the sum of my knowledge are based on these presuppositions grounded in empirical consciousness.” Ibid., 256 (80).

³³ Ibid., 263 (88).

³⁴ Ibid., 269 (94).

³⁵ Ibid., 273 (99).

³⁶ Dilthey uses Hegel as an example of a connection between life, religion, and metaphysics. Hegel’s early notes “arose from the interaction between his religious-metaphysical experiences and the interpretation of early Christian documents.”

separating water from the river.³⁷ Dilthey reminds us that worldviews are complex, plural, and multifaceted. *Weltanschauungen* are both individual and social. As life is interconnected, so too are life situations. Both cultures and individuals are reflexive and intricately interconnected with memory, tradition, and experience. The irony of the concept of worldview is that both Kant and Dilthey attempted to downplay classical metaphysics in favor of existentialist categories. Yet, both ultimately acknowledged the importance of metaphysics, even as they sought to redefine it. Worldview and metaphysics have always been interconnected, even in the melee that was post-Enlightenment idealism.

Christian Adaptation of *Weltanschauung* in James Orr

Various nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Christian theologians adapted Kant's original idea to present Christianity as a valid and comprehensive belief system.³⁸ The most notable and lasting effort was that of the Scottish Presbyterian theologian, James Orr. In 1891, Orr delivered the Kerr lectures, which were later published as the influential book *The Christian View of God and the World*.³⁹ In this work, Orr sets the tone for the evangelical adaptation and reinterpretation of *Weltanschauung*. To Orr, Christian theology owes a debt to idealism in that philosophy and theology seek the same thing. Orr talks about certain "services which the German speculative movement in the beginning of the century rendered to Christianity, in laying stress on the essential kinship which exists between the human spirit and the Divine."⁴⁰

Echoing Kant and Dilthey, Orr admitted that classical metaphysics has fallen on hard times, at least in modernity. "It is," he said, "a singular circumstance that, with all the distaste of the age for metaphysics, the tendency to the formation of world-systems, or general theories of

³⁷ Famed philosopher of history, R.G. Collingwood, used the analogy of a river to demonstrate the impossibility of objectivity in historicism. *The Idea of History* (Oxford University Press, 1994).

³⁸ The broader Christian adaptation of *Weltanschauung* is represented by three monumental figures, Søren Kierkegaard, Abraham Kuyper, and Herman Bavinck. Kierkegaard adapted Kant but added an existential aspect. He defined *Weltanschauung* as "a life-view . . . more than an aggregate, a sum-total of propositions affirmed in their abstract impartiality; it is more than experience, which as such is always atomistic, for it (a life-view) is the transubstantiation of experience, it is hard-won certainty in itself, unshakable by any experience, whether it has merely oriented itself in all the circumstances of the world. Kierkegaard, "*Af En Endu Levendes Papirer*," 1838, trans. Albert M. Wolters, in "'Weltanschauung' in the History of Ideas: Preliminary Notes," n.d., 6-8. Kuyper took *Weltanschauung* and adapted it in his neo-Calvinism. For him, a worldview was culture shaping, a comprehensive schema that should play itself out in politics and scholarship. See Wolters, "On the Idea of Worldview and Its Relation to Philosophy," in *Stained Glass: Worldviews and Social Science*, ed. Paul A. Marshall, Sander Griffioen, Richard J. Mouw (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1989), 20-21. Another Dutch Calvinist, Herman Bavinck, incorporated worldview, or what he described as "unified [*einheitliche*] world-and-life view," as a way of championing Christianity above 19th-century nihilistic philosophies. Modernity had left the world in angst with contradictory, empty beliefs. In his well-known work, *Christian Worldview*, Bavinck demonstrated that Christianity fulfilled humanity's three overarching questions; the answers to which form a worldview. "What is the relation between thinking and being, between being and becoming, and between becoming and acting?" Trans. Nathaniel G. Sutanto, James Eglinton, and Cory C. Brock (Wheaton: Crossway, 2019), 29. These questions summarize the concepts of dialectics, physics, and ethics. History, according to Bavinck, is presented as various values, some leading to disarray and others leading to "the true, the good, and the beautiful" (pg. 118). Bavinck went so far as to say that "without Christianity there is no possibility of history in the proper sense, no history of the world and humanity" (pg. 120).

³⁹ (Grand Rapids: Kregel, 1989 reprint from 1887 original). Carl H. Henry said that Orr's book was required reading for many years at Wheaton. "Fortunes of the Christian World View," *Trinity Theological Journal* 19 (1998): 163.

⁴⁰ *The Christian View of God and the World*, 120.

the universe, was never more powerful than at the present day.”⁴¹ While not celebrating the demise of metaphysics, Orr claims that the idea of *Weltanschauung* most accurately describes Christianity as a system of thought. Recognizing Kant’s development of the term regarding experiential reflections, Orr said that, “the thing itself [worldview] is as old as the dawn of reflection and is found in a cruder or more advanced form in every religion and philosophy with any pretensions to a historical character.”⁴² Like Kant, Orr’s idea of worldview is “the systematic connection of all our experiences into a unity of a world-whole.”⁴³

Orr’s adaptation of worldview centers on three foundations upon which he builds his novel understanding of Christianity as a *Weltanschauung*. The first foundation of Orr’s belief that Christianity is a worldview is the idea of an experiential and anthropological basis of understanding. Observation and knowledge, as phenomena, must be seen through the lens of human experience. Kant’s bifurcation of the phenomenal and noumenal finds its place in Orr. At the same time, Orr recognizes Christianity as a “fact.” Christian knowledge is both internal and external, both subjective and objective. “...the facts of Christianity, rightly understood and interpreted, not only yield special doctrines, but compel us to develop out of them a determinate ‘*Weltanschauung*.’”⁴⁴ Outside realities exist but must also be internalized. The subject must observe the object. Doctrines result from observation and classification. In this, Orr appreciated Kant’s challenge to older dogmatic theology.⁴⁵ Here, however, is where Orr deviates from Kant. In Kant, worldview is primarily tacit, supersensible, and presumed. It can be constructed, but only because it is already ready-at-hand. It cannot be created from observation. Orr’s determinative *Weltanschauung* results in a concept that is entirely different than Kant’s idealism. Worldview becomes more of a construct rather than an *a priori* life situation in which someone already exists. It’s less of an intuition and more of an intellectual endeavor, something which Kant ascribed only to God.

Second, Orr sees a worldview as an apologetic. A Christian *Weltanschauung* is a unified conceptual framework in contrast to others. He said, “There is a definite Christian view of things, which has a character, coherence, and unity of its own, and stands in sharp contrast with counter theories and speculations, and ... this world-view has the stamp of reason and reality upon itself, and can amply justify itself at the bar of both history and experience.”⁴⁶ With this logic Orr desired to accomplish two things. First, Christianity must be considered a whole system. “Everywhere,” he noted, “the minds of men are opening to the conception that, whatever else the universe is, it is one—one set of laws holds the whole together—one order reigns through all. Everywhere, accordingly, we see a straining after a universal point of view—a grouping and grasping of things together in their unity.”⁴⁷ As Kant was influenced by Newtonian physics, Orr was influenced by Kantian cosmology. Though Christianity is not a scientific system, it is, as Orr claimed, a “fundamental postulate” which “necessarily brings it into comparison” with other

⁴¹ Orr, *The Christian View of God and the World*, 7.

⁴² Ibid., 5.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 23.

⁴⁵ “At the head of the great philosophical movement, which has had so powerful an effect on theology in the nineteenth century, we must, without dispute, place the name of Immanuel Kant. Kant’s immediate service was to destroy the superficial dogmatizing of the older schools, and to drive the human spirit back on itself in search of a new principle of knowledge.” *The Progress of Dogma* (London: James Clarke, 1901), 321.

⁴⁶ Orr, *The Christian View of God and the World*, 16.

⁴⁷ Ibid., 8.

worldviews.⁴⁸ Next, Orr demonstrates that Christianity stands in stark contrast to various worldviews, particularly naturalism, deism, and pantheism. “If apologetic is to be spoken of, this surely is the truest and best form of Christian apology—to show that in Christianity, and nowhere else, the severed portions of truth found in all other systems are organically united.”⁴⁹ In this way, Orr could easily organize belief systems. Two millennia of Christian thought stood in stark contrast to the nearly innumerable cultures, philosophies, and concepts that joined its history. In fact, because Orr believed Christianity was a singular worldview, apologetics is its primary mechanism of description. “No duty is more imperative on the Christian teacher than that of showing that instead of Christianity being simply one theory among the rest it is really the higher truth which is the synthesis and completion of all the others,—that view which, rejecting the error, takes up the vitalizing elements in all other system and religions, and united them into a living organism.”⁵⁰

Third, Orr adopted Kant’s understanding of ethics and judgment. *Weltanschauung* is not simply a set of beliefs, but primarily an ethical and moral orientation. Phenomenal conceptualization must lead to judgments, both reflexive and objective. For Kant, world intuition is necessary for any judgment because observation can never contain the whole. An *a priori* grid must already be in place. Any concept of history presumes moral categories. In Orr, Christianity as a *Weltanschauung* necessitates morality as the overarching governance. He said, “It was true intuition, as I have already granted, which led Kant to give the primacy to the practical reason, and to base the proof of God’s moral purpose and world-end on that which alone can sustain it—the consciousness of moral law.”⁵¹ For both Kant and Orr, morality necessitated practicality in reason. A worldview helps to locate ethical judgments, as they must correlate with a universal reality, since the universe is a singular, whole reality.⁵² In essence, Orr attempted to correlate a form of Christian metaphysics with Copernican and Newtonian cosmology.

Orr’s reinvention of Kant’s concept resulted in three significant changes that have continued to affect evangelicalism as it perpetuates ideas of worldview. First, Orr’s adaptation represented an attempt to “retool Christianity in a modern context.”⁵³ He held onto Kant’s phenomenal and noumenal distinction while postulating God “as an object of knowledge.”⁵⁴ God becomes the subject of knowledge more so than the giver and ideal of knowledge. Christian metaphysics takes a turn away from reflecting the Good, Beautiful, and True in understanding essence and reality, instead constructing these things as noumenal, which can be conceived phenomenologically. God becomes a proof to which a grid points rather than the basis for the grid. This allows God to be empirically verified, though not observed. Inductive methodologies become the lines in the grid that is Orr’s *Weltanschauung*. Alan Pihringer, in examining Orr’s

⁴⁸ Orr, *The Christian View of God and the World*, 9. Orr refers to I.A. Dorner’s *System of Doctrine*, Vol. 1 (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1880), 155–56, in which Dorner compares Christianity with other “subject-object” systems.

⁴⁹ Orr, *The Christian View of God and the World*, 12.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 321. For Orr, there every worldview could be further delineated into three main categories, which themselves comprised a worldview. The “scientific” – in which the “observer is in the objective world, and things are viewed, as it were, wholly from without; the “philosophical” – “which precisely inverts this relation. The standpoint here is the thinking Ego, and things are regarded from within in their relations to thought and knowledge;” the “religious” – “which views everything from the standpoint of the consciousness of dependence upon God and refers all back to God” (pg. 369).

⁵² Alan Joseph Pihringer, “From Orr to Zacharias and Beyond: An Approach towards Christian Apologetics from the Purview of Worldview Truth Testing,” (PhD Thesis, Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 2019), 39.

⁵³ Sanchez, “Orr and Kant: An Analysis,” 120.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 118.

adaptation of Kant, states that in Orr, “the mind attempts to bring unity to the fragmented facts and information with which it interacts, endeavoring to form a general law or positive theory which gives answers to the great questions of life.”⁵⁵ Contrary to Kant, Orr “proceeds to render noumenal ideas, such as the idea of God and of the world as a whole, as phenomena.”⁵⁶ Kant understands *Weltanschauung* as noumenal in that it must be already, *a priori*, and super-comprehensible. It can be constructed only because it already exists. In Orr, *Weltanschauung* becomes the end result of an indicative assembly, summarizing facts and propositions into a unified whole. God and the Christian life become a postulate, as evident in Orr’s titles of the third through fifth chapters of *The Christian View of God and the World*.⁵⁷

Second, by insisting that Christianity is a *Weltanschauung* in contrast to other *Weltanschauungen*, Orr reinvents Kant and Dilthey. In Kant, worldview is organic but complex. In Dilthey, worldview is legion; it interacts and is interwoven with many other aspects of life. Although the Christian life and belief may be seen as unique, the lives of Christians are not. Christians inhabit a diverse range of cultures, philosophies, and concepts. A perfect example of this is the concept of *Weltanschauung* itself. Kant’s idea of worldview must be situated within some form of idealism. It is a modern concept with which Orr, ironically, attempts to critique modernity. By switching from metaphysical categories to an all-encompassing, supposedly simplifying *Weltanschauung*, Orr alters the very concepts of worldview itself. Philosophy, metaphysics, culture, aesthetics, and so on, all become wrapped in a tidy epistemological bow, ready to be presented in contrast with other, clear systems. Kant and Dilthey show us that *Weltanschauung* is not so simple and is never its own *sine qua non*.

Lastly, because Orr so readily adapts *Weltanschauung*, he suffers from the same issues that plagued Kant and Dilthey, namely, attempting to reinvent metaphysics. Kant’s revolution “established the conditions for objective knowledge of appearances by positing that the human mind creates the objects of its knowledge through an *a priori* synthesis.”⁵⁸ For Kant, this synthesis is *Weltanschauung*: an intuition that is present in everyone because of being in the world and a part of it. For Orr, this synthesis is Christianity. Metaphysics moves from first causes to first experiences. The intuition of worldview is not reflective of a higher ideal or order but is reflected in the phenomenal mind of the person. James Sire, who will be discussed in the next section, aptly said that in developing a Christian *Weltanschauung*, Orr was “not interested in the categories by which the world is grasped but in the character of the world itself.”⁵⁹

Current Understandings of *Weltanschauung*

Orr’s influence on evangelicalism has been vast and varied.⁶⁰ Today, while many have grappled with the concept of worldview and Christianity, three stand out as reflective of current

⁵⁵ Pihringer, “From Orr to Zacharias and Beyond,” 39.

⁵⁶ Sanchez, “Orr and Kant: An Analysis,” 120.

⁵⁷ “The Theistic Postulate of the Christian View” (pgs. 73–116); “The Postulate of the Christian View of the World in Regard to Nature and Man” (pgs. 117–62); “The Postulate of the Christian View in Regard to the Sin and Disorder of the World,” (pgs. 163–212).

⁵⁸ Sanchez, “Orr and Kant: An Analysis,” 117.

⁵⁹ James Sire, *Naming the Elephant: Worldview as a Concept*, 45.

⁶⁰ See fn. 35. For more on Orr’s influence in this era, see Glen G. Scorgie, “A Call for Continuity, the Theological Contribution of James Orr,” (PhD Thesis, St. Andrews, 1986), 72–77.

uses and understandings. James Sire, former editor for InterVarsity Press, authored two influential books on worldview.⁶¹ Sire defines worldview as

A commitment, a fundamental orientation of the heart, that can be expressed as a story or in a set of presuppositions (assumptions which may be true, partially true or entirely false) which hold (consciously or subconsciously, consistently or inconsistently) about which the basic constitution of reality, and that provides the foundation on which we live and move and have our being.⁶²

Sire evolved in his understanding, particularly after reading Naugle and incorporating a philosophical and historical knowledge of the concept. He built upon the idea that a worldview is defined as a set of belief systems or presuppositions, to include more existential ideas like narrative (story). In Sire, we see an attempt to correlate Orr with Kant. Worldview is reflexive (aesthetic/judgment), presuppositional, and moral (in that it provides a foundation for how life is lived). Like Orr, however, Sire suffers from several deficiencies that limit his understanding and blur problems. First, while Sire attempts to correlate his definition of worldview with Christian metaphysics, he ends up in the same boat as Orr, paddling in a different direction. He said, “As I have been maintaining throughout this book, it is understanding the way things *really are* that is more important. Ontology precedes epistemology. Ontology precedes ethics. Who and what is there directs how we are to behave toward what is true.”⁶³ While this is a nod to the *a priori* nature of metaphysics, Sire still commits Orr's error. Metaphysics, and ontology with it, isn't something that is constructed but something reflected. At least Kant's experiential metaphysics acknowledges its priority.

Second, Sire follows Orr's mistake in conceiving of worldview as something external through which one interprets reality. He said that worldview becomes “our ‘reading glasses,’ our ‘telescope,’ our ‘place to stand’ to view reality, the hub of our world, the heart of ourselves.”⁶⁴ This is a prevailing idea in evangelicalism. Indeed, while Kant's and Dilthey's concept of *Weltanschauung* encompasses the notion of influencing outlook, it is fundamentally more internal, involving the phenomenal grasp of the noumenal, an *a priori* that is prior to the subject-object relationship. It is something in which an individual finds himself already. It is a world-intuition that presumes it can grasp the magnitude of reality in a comprehensive concept. Less of an external tool through which we view reality and more of an internal orientation of experience.

The second contemporary thinker on worldview is David Naugle. His book, *Worldview: The History of a Concept*, is the most influential current work on the subject.⁶⁵ Naugle has the best grasp of the history, backgrounds, and variety of definitions and uses of worldview. For Naugle, Christianity changed Kant and Dilthey to include an idea of objectivity in something external.⁶⁶ Ultimately, Naugle understands worldview as a “view of the world and the resulting

⁶¹ See fn. 4. Sire's first work on worldview was *The Universe Next Door*, originally published in 1988 by InterVarsity Press, is on its sixth edition. His second work of note was *Naming the Elephant: Worldview as a Concept* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2015) and is on its second edition.

⁶² Sire, *Naming the Elephant*, 141.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 125.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁵ See the book review by Arthur F. Homles in *Philosophia Christi* 5 no. 2 (2003): 644–47, <https://doi.org/10.5840/pc20035271>.

⁶⁶ Naugle, *Worldview: The History of a Concept*, 260.

way of life in it.”⁶⁷ Though more extensive than Sire’s definition, Naugle’s definition still falls short. It presumes *Weltanschauung* is something that can be put on in the sense of an internal view that examines external things. Again, the best example of this is glasses or lenses, things that clarify and color our reality.⁶⁸ Naugle is correct, however, in understanding the existential element in seeing it as a way of life.

Naugle’s contribution to this field also includes philosophical and theological warnings that help to clarify the meaning of worldview further. Ironically, Naugle shows that the greatest philosophical danger in adopting contemporary understandings of worldview wholesale comes from the existentialist Martin Heidegger.

To be sure, the phrase “world view” is open to misunderstanding, as though it were merely a matter here of a passive contemplation of the world. For this reason, already in the nineteenth century, it was emphasized with justification that “world view” also meant and even meant primarily “view of life.” The fact that, despite this, the phrase “world view” asserts itself as the name for the position of man in the midst of all that is, is proof of how decisively the world became pictured as soon as man brought his life as *subjectum* into precedence over other centers of relationship.⁶⁹

For Heidegger, worldview, and all its ambiguity, has more to do with the person than the world. *Weltanschauung*, as particularly seen in Orr, places humanity at the center of reality. Man becomes a “particular being who gives measure and draws up the guidelines for everything that is.”⁷⁰ Man is the subject, whereas the cosmos, including God, is an object. Kant’s definition of something intuitive within humanity that presumes a universal concept is still Cartesian and modern, even while acknowledging the importance of metaphysics. Observation becomes muddled with belief. Objectivism still reigns.

Theologically, Naugle includes a warning against presuming the concept of worldview somehow unites all humanity. Citing philosopher W. T. Jones, Naugle reminds his readers that past thinkers, such as medieval theologians, saw their relationship with the cosmos through the lens of sacramentalism.⁷¹ Humanity’s situation within the universe was not one of observation, but rather one of wonder and awe. The ancients did not observe things through a subject-object relationship. Observation was more doxological than epistemological. Orr’s adaptation makes this mistake. Kant is at least somewhat aware of the difference.

The third key individual to explore worldview recently is Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor. First seen in his exhaustive work, *A Secular Age*,⁷² Taylor employs the idea of “social imaginary” to describe a concept like worldview, and to show that the Enlightenment, with all its revolutions, brought a new cosmic imagery, one that presumed mechanisms as the fundamental reality. This “world-picture,” as Taylor describes it, “dissipated totally the earlier view of a meaning in things captured in the Platonic-Aristotelian idea that the world around us was the

⁶⁷ Class notes given at Dallas Baptist University, 3.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁶⁹ Martin Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 134.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

⁷¹ Naugle, *Worldview: The History of a Concept*, 333. Citing W. T. Jones, *The Medieval Mind in the History of Western Philosophy*, vol. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1969), p. xix.

⁷² (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007).

realization of Forms.”⁷³ This mimics Kant’s downplaying of classic metaphysics. Taylor then describes social imaginary as the “largely unstructured and inarticulate understanding of our whole situation, with which particular features of our world show up for us in the sense they have. It can never be adequately expressed in the form of explicit doctrines, because of its very unlimited and indefinite nature.”⁷⁴ Several observations stand out. First, Taylor’s social imaginary recognizes that the grid of *Weltanschauung* cannot be articulated or entirely systematized. It is immediate, tacit, and whole. Second, these features appear in a form already understood. It is in a precognitive sense. Taylor elucidates this by stating that, “Humans operated with a social imaginary, well before they ever got in the business of theorizing about themselves.”⁷⁵

Second, Taylor’s social imaginaries echo Dilthey’s understanding of the complexities of life and worldview as both social and plural. While Orr’s adaptation of worldview unwittingly isolates a person as the subject and the cosmos as the object, Taylor includes the idea of pre-cognitive presumption. He states, “This understanding supposes, if it is to make sense, a wider grasp of our whole predicament: how we stand to each other, how we got to where we are, how we relate to other groups, and so on.”⁷⁶ Taylor focuses on the “way ordinary people imagine their social surroundings, and this is often not expressed in theoretical terms, but is carried in images, stories, and legends.”⁷⁷ Taylor clearly understands Dilthey’s contribution to the linguistic/poetic aspect of *Weltanschauung*. History, for Taylor and Dilthey, isn’t theoretical or the result of a subject-object relationship. It is organic, cultural, and “being-immersed-in-life-itself.”⁷⁸

The third strength in Taylor’s social imaginary is that it recognizes the understanding of imagery in the imaginary. People, societies, cultures, and so on, reflect something. Presumptions precede individual actions because actions and beliefs are never truly individual. We operate from a collective imagination that is supersensible. Taylor’s understanding of worldview aligns with the concept of complex, collective, and experiential metaphysics. Social imaginary presupposes some sort of idealism. These “modes of understanding,” are “often inseparable, just because the self-understandings are the essential condition of the practice making sense that it does to participants. Because human practices are the kind of thing that makes sense, certain ideas are internal to them; one cannot distinguish the two in order to ask the question Which causes which?”⁷⁹ This is key and reflects a more authentic understanding of worldview than

⁷³ Taylor, *A Secular Age*, 367.

⁷⁴ Naugle, *Worldview: The History of a Concept*, 173.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ *Modern Social Imaginary* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004), 24.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 23.

⁷⁸ This idea reflects the understanding of “thrownness” in Heidegger’s examination of *Dasein*. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time (Sein und Zeit)*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962). A person doesn’t approach the world as distinct from his experiences. He is “thrown” in the sense that he already has meaning from being in the world. This is involuntary. He is thrown into a world that already has meaning, history, structures, etc. “Is not *Dasein*, as thrown-Being-in-the-world, thrown proximally right into the publicness of the ‘they’? And what does publicness mean, other than the specific disclosedness of the ‘they’?”, 210 (167). Heidegger believes the idea of “Being-in-the-world” is more fully seen in the society as “Being-with-one-another in the world,” 219, (174). This affects every aspect of *Dasein*, including *Dasein*’s understanding of the world around it. Facts in the world are not simple objects that can be known through the subject/object relationship. Facts are always understood through *Dasein*’s inherent and automatic existence *within* the world. “Facticity is not the factuality of the *factum brutum* of something present-at-hand, but a characteristic of *Dasein*’s *Being*—one which has been taken up into existence,” 174 (135).

⁷⁹ Ibid., 31–32.

Orr's adaptation. Worldviews are not something that color or clarify our understanding of objects or objectivity; they are something so internal, so *a priori*, so intuitive, they cannot be seen in a cause/effect relationship. Orr's objectivity changed Kant and Dilthey to the extent that worldviews became something that could be changed, understood, and adapted. Indeed, seeing Christianity as a *Weltanschauung* implies such. Instead, Taylor's social imaginary is more nuanced and complex. Ideas and images are never naked. As Taylor states, "Ideas always come in history wrapped up in certain practices, even if these are only discursive practices."⁸⁰ Motivations for actions may vary, as Kant's reflexive judgments imply. The phenomenal and noumenal aren't simply in a subject-object relationship; they are more direct, more organic. Taylor's definition tries to avoid the philosophical and theological errors of a wholesale acceptance of worldview.

Understanding *Weltanschauung* and Religious Metaphysics

So, what is a worldview, and how does it relate to philosophy, specifically metaphysics? Should we closely follow Kant and Dilthey, or be allowed the ambiguity and reinvention of Orr? Furthermore, should Christians be wary of accepting an idea that is foundational to the "spirit of modernity?"⁸¹ For Albert Wolters, the concept of worldview is related to philosophy in various ways, the most balanced of which is that worldview both yields to and crowns philosophy.⁸² The concept of worldview shouldn't be seen as something contrary to or even distinct from philosophy. It was spawned directly from a specific philosophical model: German idealism. Like *Weltanschauung* itself, the concept of worldview has a particular worldview: modernity. This doesn't deny its contribution but frames it in historical philosophy. At the same time, the concept of worldview seeks to pose questions that philosophy, specifically metaphysics, addresses: What is the nature of reality? What is my relation to reality? What are identity, substance, etc.? Metaphysics, as a subset of philosophy, deals with these pre-theoretical ideas.

This is especially true of Dilthey's contribution to *Weltanschauung*. Dilthey brought idealism into the realm of the social. He demonstrated that an *a priori* world intuition must be situated in life, and a life is always situated in society. Classical metaphysics were often seen as categories and systems, whereas Dilthey (and Kant to a lesser extent) recognized a reflective metaphysic.⁸³ The meaning of life must include, at least tacitly, the interconnection of life in

⁸⁰ Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginary*, 32.

⁸¹ Albert Wolters wonders if it is wise for Christians to accept something so basic to modernity. Wolters says that *Weltanschauung*, and its iterations, "manifests itself in historicism, the autonomy of science, and the privatization of religion." "On the Idea of Worldview and Its Relation to Philosophy," in *Stained Glass: Worldviews and Social Science*, ed. Paul A. Marshall, Sander Griffioen, and Richard J. Mouw (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1989), 19.

⁸² Ibid. Wolters shows five ways in which worldview related to philosophy: 1) repels philosophy – exists in tension as in theory vs. existence (*gratia contra naturam* in Anabaptism); 2) Crowns philosophy – relates to the highest and most fundamental questions of philosophy (*gratia supra naturam* in Roman Catholicism); 3) flanks philosophy – kept separate from philosophy as a scientific endeavor, e.g. Heinrich Rickert and Edmund Husserl (*gratia iuxta naturam* in Lutheranism); 4) yields to philosophy – philosophy doesn't produce a worldview but is produced by a worldview (*gratia intra naturam* in Calvinism); 5) equal to worldview – worldview is nothing more than scientific philosophy, e.g. dialectical materialism in Friedrich Engels and Karl Marx (*gratia instar naturae* in liberalism) pgs. 16–17; 24.

⁸³ This is further explained in Rudolf Markkeel, "Metaphysics and the Hermeneutical Significance of Worldviews," *The Review of Metaphysics* 74 no. 2 (2020), 321, <https://doi.org/10.1353/rvm.2020.0072>.

society. Worldview and metaphysics are not separate, but a proper understanding of *Weltanschauung* connects a person's life to metaphysics, even with an idealistic bent.

If Kant provided the idea of a pre-theoretical, comprehensive intuition, and Dilthey provided the idea that life is complex and interconnected, Taylor's social imaginary best reflects an accurate description of worldview. A worldview is sourced in life yet outside of it, individual yet a part of a society, *a priori* and intuitive, plural and complex. It is a non-systematic system. A **social metaphysic**. Karl Jaspers, philosopher and psychiatrist, understood worldview as a paradox, something both objective and subjective.⁸⁴ Simple conceptualizations of the world are not, in his view, concrete enough. In explaining Jaspers, Elena Alessiato notes that the conceptualization of worldview is revealed in objective historical manifestations. These include "religious doctrines, scientific theories, moral principles or an ethical canon, social habits, past interpretations, mythological narrative, and so on."⁸⁵ For Jaspers, the inner life or worldview moves from the inside of a person's life to the outside world.

Orr's adaptation mistakenly isolated worldview into something that was outside of the person, which he or she could adopt, and then inward change would take place. His wedding of apologetics to worldview only furthered the mistake. This meant that Orr had to see worldview in binary terms as something versus something else. Hence, Christianity, as a *Weltanschauung*, is measured against other "worldviews," such as secularism, naturalism, etc. Worldview became something one could adopt, change, and objectify. As stated before, it became a binary lens through which to view the universe and God.

Orr's binary understanding is played out in much of contemporary evangelical theology. Most adopt a subject-object apologetic interpretation. For example, Graham Cole defines a worldview as "frame of reference" through which we interpret our experiences.⁸⁶ He acknowledges that "we all have at least one, or maybe bits of different ones that we have never been able to connect up into some sort of coherent whole."⁸⁷ For Cole, worldview is something that acts as a grid for life. While this appropriates some of Kant's intention, Cole still sees worldview as something external to the person. He asks the "real question" of "where do we find a frame of reference or a worldview that tells a coherent and consistent story that really understands us and illuminates the actual world in which we live?"⁸⁸ Cole, like others, sees worldview as some all-encompassing luminary, revealing the world. If this is the case, how is worldview tacit and intuitive? How is it internal?

Some evangelicals prefer to attach the adjective "biblical" to worldview. Josh Mulvihill defines a "biblical worldview" as "a set of beliefs, assumptions, or values based upon the Bible that determines how a person lives."⁸⁹ And "the goal of worldview training is to shape beliefs with the Bible..."⁹⁰ Additionally, a biblical worldview can be summarized in the words "creation, rebellion, salvation, and restoration."⁹¹ *Weltanschauung* cannot be seen as simply a set of beliefs because faith isn't reflexive or intuitive; it is directive and given towards something

⁸⁴ Karl Jaspers, *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen* (Berlin: Julius Springer, 1919).

⁸⁵ Elena Paola Carola Alessiato, "What is a Worldview? Some Suggestions from the History of the Concept," *Negotiation Journal: Oxford* 38 no. 3 (2022), 402, <https://doi.org/10.1111/nejo.12404>.

⁸⁶ Cole, *What is a Christian Worldview*, 5.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Mulvihill, *Biblical Worldview*, 36.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Ibid., 37.

outside of the person. The idea of “biblical” isn’t an *a priori*, supersensible, and experiential metaphysic.

Others have followed Orr’s apologetic, theological creation of worldview. Ronnie Campbell applies his understanding of worldview apologetically in considering theodicy. He defines worldview as “a conceptual system, or a particular way of looking at the world, by which a person or group of people understand(s) and engage(s) life.”⁹² He further defines Christianity as a “metaphysical system,” comparing it to others (i.e., naturalism, pantheism, process pantheism, etc.) regarding how each system addresses the problem of evil.⁹³ Campbell’s perspectival apology sounds more like Orr than Kant. While Campbell is commended for his attempt to connect worldview to metaphysics, he still presumes that worldview is something external to the individual. As Kant demonstrates, *Weltanschauung* precedes the subject-object relationship, not exists between them.

Campbell’s biggest mistake, however, is to equate Christianity and metaphysics. Alfred North Whitehead, the early twentieth-century philosopher and mathematician, said that, unlike other religions, “Christianity has always been a religion searching for a metaphysic.”⁹⁴ Christianity is a revealed religion that presumes a God who is simultaneously distinct and present. Since history, as Whitehead believed, “presupposes a metaphysic,” Christianity is both *historical*, as revelation exists in space and time, and *ahistorical*, as biblical revelation transcends these and points to a future eschaton.⁹⁵ Christianity’s point is salvation from this world and entrance into another. It addresses human existence and the nature of reality, but these are not its primary concerns. According to Whitehead, all “religions require a metaphysical backing” as “the foundations of dogma must be laid in a rational metaphysics which criticizes meanings, and endeavours to express the most general concepts adequate for the all-inclusive universe.”⁹⁶ This is key in that Whitehead acknowledges both a distinction and connection between Christianity and metaphysics. Christianity is not a metaphysic; hence, it cannot be simply a social metaphysic or worldview. Rather, metaphysics, and particularly social metaphysics, act as a ground for the necessary dogmas and correlations that proceed from Christianity. Christians need metaphysics to articulate the experience and systems of revelation into something that is “adequate for that all-inclusive universe,” or worldview.

Philosopher William Hasker also warns against equating metaphysics, philosophy, and the idea of worldview with Christianity. First, according to Hasker, no one metaphysic or worldview can be definitively Christian.⁹⁷ Theologians have always parsed metaphysical systems to see if they are consistent or inconsistent with Christianity.⁹⁸ Echoing Whitehead, Hasker says that “the fact that Christianity is a religion of salvation also suggests that in a sense no

⁹² *Worldviews and The Problem of Evil: A Comparative Approach* (Bellingham, WA: Lexham Press, 2019), 266.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 2–3.

⁹⁴ *Religion in the Making: 1926 Lowell Lectures* (Cambridge University Press, 1927), 32. Whitehead gives Buddhism as an example of a religion which is “generating a metaphysic.”

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 72. Whitehead also described something similar to Kant’s *Weltanschauung* in that he believed that human existence, within a society, necessitated *a priori* principles upon which you must interpret the whole around you. He said, “You can only interpret the past in terms of the present. The present is all that you have; and unless in this present you can find general principles which interpret the present as including a representation of the whole community of existents, you cannot move a step beyond your little patch of immediacy,” 72.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 71.

⁹⁷ William Hasker, *Metaphysics: Constructing a Worldview*, in *Contours of Christian Philosophy*, ed. Stephen Evans (Downer’s Grove: IVP Academic, 1983), 119.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

philosophical system can be fully Christian, because no philosophical system can express the unique content of Christianity.”⁹⁹

Weltanschauung is not a lens, it’s not simple, it’s not an apologetic, and it’s not Christianity. One cannot have a “Christian worldview,” at least when understanding Kant and Dilthey. Christians live within various worldviews, which are complex, social, and interconnected. Social imaginaries and social metaphysics are as nuanced as the societies in which they exist. Christians belong to the river of human ideas and presuppositions, constantly flowing and changing. A Christian views Christianity from various *Weltanschauungen*, from various *a priori* social metaphysics, as complex and intertwined as life itself.

Understanding *Weltanschauung* and Biblical Theology

The final goal of this paper is to connect a proper understanding of worldview as an inherent and intuited social metaphysic to biblical theology. While many aspects of this relationship should be explored, only two are necessary for this essay: the observable organic unity of the Scriptures and their ability to self-organize and interpret.

Biblical theology is a relatively young discipline, and its current iterations find their origins in nineteenth-century German theology.¹⁰⁰ At its core, biblical theology presumes that Scripture inherently contains a self-disclosing narrative or framework that can be traced through both testaments. This framework is defined primarily by a “canonical criteria,” as Brevard Childs put it, which distinguishes between apostolic authority and early ecclesiastical tradition.¹⁰¹ This canonical approach places each book of Scripture within both its historical and linguistic milieu and its inherent, self-disclosed framework. Old and New Testaments engage in a “dialogical” conversation, moving past the “textual level” and emphasizing that which “unites dissident voices into a harmonious whole.”¹⁰² Geerhardus Vos, an early evangelical proponent of biblical

⁹⁹ Hasker, *Metaphysics: Constructing a Worldview*, 119.

¹⁰⁰ See C.H.H. Scobie, “History of Biblical Theology,” in *The New Dictionary of Biblical Theology*, ed. by Alexander T. Desmond and Brian S. Rosner (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2000), 11–20. Beginning in the nineteenth century with Ludwig Baumgartens-Crusius’s *Grundzüge der Biblischen Theologie* (Jena, Germany: Fredrick Frommann, 1828) in 1828, German critical scholars began to adopt a more historical approach to biblical interpretation while also emphasizing “the essential unity of Scripture.” In doing so, theologians began looking for literary commonality in Scripture in addition to contextual and historical distinctions between testaments. Some sought a grand scheme or thread that would connect the vast aspects of Scripture, rather than adopting a more systematic or dogmatic approach (E.g., H. Ewald, *Die Lehre der Bibel von Gott oder Theologie des Alten und Neuen Bundes* (Leipzig: Böhme & Drescher, 1876). One such example was Johannes von Hofmann, a professor at Erlangen Seminary in the mid-nineteenth century. In contrast to F.C. Bauer’s Hegelianism at the then-new Tübingen, Hofmann’s “Erlangen school of theology” adopted the idea that the Bible disclosed itself through a *Heilsgegeschichte*, which can be found at the heart of each narrative. See J.C.K. von Hofmann, *Interpreting the Bible*, trans. Christian Preus (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1959). For Hofmann, this was the fundamental aspect of interpretation. Ironically, some have placed the concept of *Heilsgegeschichte* well within the worldview of romanticism. Robert Yarbrough traces much of Hofmann’s nascent biblical-theological method to a contrast of eighteenth-century historical philosophies as played out in nineteenth-century hermeneutics. *The Salvation-Historical Fallacy? Reassessing the History of New Testament Theology* (Leiderdorp: Deo Publishing, 2004). See Scobie, “History of Biblical Theology,” 12; Ernst-Wilhelm Wendebourg, “Die Heilsgeschichtliche Theologie J. Chr. K. v. Hofmanns in ihrem Verhältnis zur Romantischen Weltanschauung,” *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* 52 No. 1 (1955): 64–104; Matthew L. Becker, *The Self-Giving God and Salvation History: The Trinitarian Theology of Johannes von Hofmann* (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2014). Also, Brevard S. Childs gives a concise history of biblical theology in *Biblical Theology: A Proposal* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2000), 1–12.

¹⁰¹ Childs, *Biblical Theology*, 30–31.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 66.

theology, claimed that it is a “branch of Exegetical Theology which deals with the process of self-revelation of God deposited in the Bible.”¹⁰³ Vos defined exegetical theology as a variety of disciplines, all emphasizing the need to study the contents of Scripture as divine, self-disclosing revelation given in space and time, and to collect them into a unified whole.¹⁰⁴ Biblical theology, in this way, presumes a “historic progressiveness of the revelation process,” the “embodiment of revelation in history,” and “the organic nature of the historic process observable in revelation.”¹⁰⁵

Vos and others understood this organic nature of a unified whole as more than an observation; it is a theological and hermeneutical method.¹⁰⁶ Understanding this inherently brings out what Brevard Childs called the “kerygmatic content of the Bible, [in] which the interpreter of the Bible was urged always to keep clear in sight in order to comprehend the true nature of the biblical witness.”¹⁰⁷ There is one, single, “unified voice in Scripture.”¹⁰⁸ The theological method, therefore, is something that is universal, and this universality of understanding contains not only every interpreter but also spans the generations of interpreters and bridges the historical gap between the current world and the world of the Bible.

The second aspect is that of an inherent, tacit interpretation within Scripture. Brian Rosner believes that biblical theology should seek to “analyse and synthesize the Bible’s teaching about God and his relations to the world on its own terms.”¹⁰⁹ Scripture itself provides the terms or outline of interpretation from which systematization must occur. The kerygmatic content, or interpretive main themes, of Scripture are universal *and* self-interpreting. The Bible gives its own grid, its own interpretative metaphysic, if you will, with which the interpreter must interact. Herman Ridderbos implies something similar as he connects the study of canonicity, identical to Child’s canonical criteria, to an *a priori* belief.¹¹⁰ Contrary to the Augustinian view that the authority of the canon of Scripture rests upon ecclesiastical authority, biblical theology sees canonicity as inherent within theology and revelation, requiring no outside or external sources. This aligns with Protestant ecclesiology and bibliology, but biblical theology also presupposes that the *a priori* nature of canonicity is a result of its own, self-disclosing, redemptive-historical order.¹¹¹

This results in a tendency to view biblical theology and systematic theology as distinctly separate, even if somewhat interrelated. Because the redemptive-historical order of Scripture is inherent to its interpretation, biblical theology is often seen as hermeneutically and

¹⁰³ *Biblical Theology Old and New Testaments* (Edinburgh: The Banner of Truth Trust, 2000), 4–5.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid. “a) The study of the actual content of Holy Scripture; b) the inquiry into the origin of the several Biblical writings, including the identity of the writers, the time and occasion of composition, dependence on possible sources, etc.; c) the putting of the question of how these several writings came to be collected into the unity of the Bible or book (Canonicity); d) the study of the actual self-disclosures of God in time and space which lie back of even the first commitment to writing of any Biblical document, and which for a long time continued to run alongside of the inscription of revealed material...”

¹⁰⁵ Vos, *Biblical Theology Old and New Testaments*, 5–7.

¹⁰⁶ See Childs, *Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments: Theological Reflection on the Christian Bible* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2011), 717–26.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 725. Childs says that early church fathers and later reformers referred to this as the *scopus* of Scripture.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ “Biblical Theology,” in *The New Dictionary of Biblical Theology*, ed. by Alexander T. Desmond and Brian S. Rosner (Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2000), 10.

¹¹⁰ *Redemptive History and the New Testament Scriptures*, trans. H. De Jongste (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R Publishing, 1988), 30–31.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 33.

methodologically preceding systematic and historical theology.¹¹² Biblical theology is derived directly from Scripture, and systematic theology introduces an external framework or classification.¹¹³ Furthermore, this derivation is self-interpreting. Perspicuity is extended from the meaning of Scripture to the overall structure of Scripture.

How can a correct understanding of worldview as an inherent and intuited social metaphysic apply to biblical theology? What lessons can be learned? Four things come to mind. First, biblical theology, though never overtly, can sometimes imply a separation from metaphysics in interpretation. Kant and Dilthey, along with others, tried to divorce epistemology and interpretation from metaphysics. The phenomenal and sensible realm is divorced from the noumenal realm; our understanding of something (as it appears to us) differs from its true essence (what it is). Metaphysics lies in the noumenal realm, and we are unable to truly know or interpret it. Enter *Weltanschauung*. Our observations or phenomena must be sourced in some grid outside of and before the noumena.¹¹⁴ It must be universal and immediate. It is an experiential, *a priori* metaphysic. Similarly, biblical theology tends to presume universal and tacit interpretive narratives (e.g., *Heilsgegeschichte*). Revelation inherently reveals its grid outside of systems. Metaphysics is only applied as a part of systematic theology, correlating the specifics of revelation. Early advocates of biblical theology, such as Johannes von Hofmann, believed that Scripture implied its own grid that simply needed to be traced through narrative and canonicity.¹¹⁵ A correct understanding of worldview reminds us that interpretation is impossible outside of metaphysics, even if it's an experiential metaphysics. The biblical theological categories contained in a redemptive-historical rubric are, indeed, just that—a rubric. This rubric is not self-disclosing, nor is it self-interpreting. We apply tacit and inherent aspects of our world to Scripture. Biblical theology serves as a healthy reminder to ground interpretation in history and narrative, but it also necessarily contains presumptive systems. In this way, systematics and biblical studies are eerily similar.¹¹⁶ Thus, theology *sans* metaphysics is impossible.

Second, a rejection of Orr's apologetic and binary reinterpretation of worldview reminds us that theology, as a human task, is complex, interconnected, and social. Theologies, like worldviews, are not simply interpretive schemas through which we examine Scripture. They are both within and without of us, tacit and societal, personal and cultural. We interpret from within

¹¹² Some build a hermeneutical tower moving up from exegesis, biblical theology, systematics and historical theology, practical theology, and culminating in application. For an explanation of this see Richard B. Gaffin Jr.'s indispensable article "Systematic Theology and Biblical Theology," *Westminster Theological Journal* 38 no. 3 (Spring 1976): 281–91 and Michael Allen, "Systematic Theology and Biblical Theology, Part 1," *Journal of Reformed Theology* 14 (2020): 52–72, <https://doi.org/10.1163/15697312-bja10002>; "Systematic Theology and Biblical Theology, Part 2," *Journal of Reformed Theology* 14 (2020): 344–57, <https://doi.org/10.1163/15697312-bja10005>.

¹¹³ Charles Hodge makes this distinction (and mistake). "This constitutes the difference between biblical and systematic theology. The office of the former is to ascertain and state the facts of Scripture. The office of the latter is to take those facts, determine their relation to each other and to other cognate truths...." *Systematic Theology* Vol. 1 (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 1999), 3–4.

¹¹⁴ Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, 105 (AA5).

¹¹⁵ See footnote 100.

¹¹⁶ Allen, "Systematic Theology and Biblical Theology, Part 2," 375. Allen believes that biblical theology must never be seen as a replacement of dogmatics or exegesis. He states, "Both tasks are crucial, and neither task can be done well apart from ongoing engagement with the other. Exegesis and dogmatics have apostolic mandate for the church's ongoing intellectual life as disciples of the Word of God; ancillary helps, such as biblical theology or theological interpretation of scripture, may serve at times to reorient or infuse missing elements and recalibrate the scriptural texture of exegesis and dogmatics, though we do well to remember that, in so doing, they are functioning as an intellectual therapy or crisis intervention, not as a long-term regiment."

a culture and presume certain universal realities. Metaphysics does not operate outside of culture; it connects cultures past and present. Theology, especially biblical theology, does the same. Dilthey's socializing and historicizing contribution to *Weltanschauung* reminds theologians that they, too, operate from within philosophical ideas.¹¹⁷ Far from being a worldview, Christianity, though sourced in a transcendent revelation, operates squarely within these ideas. Biblical theologians, like all theologians, do not interpret in a historical vacuum. Theology is as complicated as life and should never be separated from it.¹¹⁸ All interpretation stems from philosophical worldviews (e.g., idealism, realism, romanticism, rationalism, etc.). Biblical theology itself is a product of a *Weltanschauung*.

The third lesson of worldview for biblical theology is one of historical and philosophical context. Worldviews, as complex social metaphysics, are not universally shared, especially across time. Missing this point not only leads to an over-emphasis on the Bible's unity (though this can be tempered), but also to presuming a shared, single worldview between Scripture's writers and interpreters. Some biblical theologians have made this mistake. James Hamilton, for example, believes that "biblical authors operated from a shared interpretive perspective. They inhabited the same thought-world, breathed its air, and shared its assumptions."¹¹⁹ Hence, biblical theology aims to "trace out the contours of the network of assumptions reflected in the writings of the biblical authors."¹²⁰ Hamilton goes so far as to say that "if we can see what the biblical authors assumed about story, symbol, and church, we will glimpse the world as they saw it. To catch a glimpse of the world as they saw it is to see the real world."¹²¹ Seeing this "real world" is possible because the Bible itself, somehow, allows you, across time, to share the assumptions of the authors, primarily because you share the same faith. As noble as this sounds, a proper understanding of worldview reminds us that it is impossible. This leads Hamilton to a similar interpretive conclusion as earlier biblical theologians, that "the Bible teaches Christians how the Bible should be read."¹²² Scripture provides, in essence, its own grid; we can assume the same things that its authors assumed, seeing the world in the same way. Kant, Dilthey, Taylor, and *Weltanschauung* disagree.

Philosophical differences may be noticeable (e.g., mind-body dualism in premodernity vs. modernity), or more subtle (e.g., sacramentalism in premodernity vs. observation in modernity¹²³). The concept of *Weltanschauung* does not imply that common interpretations are impossible. We can and should try to understand the assumptions and world of Scripture's authors as much as we can. Worldview, however, reminds us that a direct fusion of horizons, to

¹¹⁷ See Rudolf Makkreel, "Metaphysics and the Hermeneutical Relevance of Worldviews," *The Review of Metaphysics* 74 no. 2 (December 2020): 321–44, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/27068267>.

¹¹⁸ Dilthey, "The Types of World-View and their Development in Metaphysical Systems," 254 (79).

¹¹⁹ *What Is Biblical Theology? A Guide to the Bible's Story, Symbolism, and Patterns* (Wheaton: Crossway, 2013), 17. Hamilton uses the idea of the North and South Pole in expressing a unified interpretive method. The South Pole is that of liberalism's response to the Enlightenment vs. the South Pole's conservative response. Regardless, contemporary theologians "are all living in the same world, breathing the same air, sharing the same assumptions" (18). Since the Holy Spirit is the author of Scripture, contemporary interpreters can and should have the same worldview. He continues, "If biblical theology is a way to get into another world, the world inhabited by the biblical authors, you have a right to understand my intentions. My hope is that you cross the bridge into their thought-world and never come back. I hope you will breathe the air of the Bible's world, recognize it as the real Narnia, and never want to leave" (20).

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 18.

¹²² *Ibid.* 17.

¹²³ See Naugle, *Worldview: The History of a Concept*, 333.

use a Gadamerian term, is impossible.¹²⁴ We're still in the river, still intuiting ideas about reality from our own time and space. The redemptive-historical model of theology may seem obvious today, but it may not have been so obvious yesterday. Rather than deconstructing meaning and throwing our hermeneutical hands in the air in despair, *Weltanschauung* only demands nuance and a healthy understanding of our own social imaginary. Taylor's nuance fits well within biblical theology. God's question to Job in 38:22–23 is a perfect example. For contemporary interpreters, “storehouses of snow and hail” are often interpreted as merely poetic because our modern imaginary presumes the mechanistic hydrologic cycle as the cause for precipitation. Even admitting this worldview, the farthest modern Christians can stretch is to see that God employs or uses the hydro-cycle. Job, however, would not have imagined it that way. To him, there may be actual storehouses in the sky from which God meters out moisture. This is more than a simple misunderstanding; it stems from various *Weltanschauungen*. The proper use of biblical theology can, and will, help us understand this.

Lastly, biblical theology must acknowledge that it operates within the stream of ideas. It is an idea born from and inspired by the river. It must never wander too far from metaphysics, especially social metaphysics. Social metaphysics is the water in which we swim. Biblical theology is a valuable discipline and a necessary tool. It is also a systematic and philosophical endeavor, and its practitioners must recognize it as such. The nuances and complexities of worldview remind us that every aspect of theologizing, from exegesis to systematics, to history, to dogmatics, to biblical studies, to practical theology, is more interconnected than distinct. Each aspect presumes the other and forms the intricate dance that is theology. Worldview ensures that these disciplines, and our use of them, are never entirely divorced from metaphysics.

Conclusion

Perhaps Mark Ward Sr. isn't too far off in describing the ambiguity of the meaning of worldview among evangelical circles.¹²⁵ James Orr's misunderstanding and misappropriation of *Weltanschauung*, notably concerning Kant, has led to the complex idea of worldview being used as a reductionistic, binary, and inadequate substitute for robust philosophy. Interpretation and theology *sans* metaphysics is impossible, even though, as evidenced, it's been tried time and again in modernity. Kant, Dilthey, and Taylor remind us that we all operate with an inherent, *a priori* social metaphysic; something so internal and tacit that it often goes unnoticed. It is *not* a matter of belief or how we perceive the world, but rather the shared belief and vision of the world and culture in which we live. We are *Weltanschauung*. We are all born into a space and time that presumes a grid before we even view the world. Biblical theology joins other disciplines in this grid, one part of an ever-flowing framework of ideas and presumptions. Only when biblical theology incorporates a proper understanding of metaphysics can it remind us that we do not share the same worldviews as the biblical authors, nor can we simply bypass or overlook more than two millennia of ideas. We are a product of those ideas. A good biblical theology not only recognizes this but also celebrates it.

¹²⁴ Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, trans. Joel Wizenheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Continuum, 1975), 302; *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, trans. David E. Linge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 39–42.

¹²⁵ Ward, “Christian Worldview,” 23.